

The Swedish Defence Commission's interim report on the current state of Sweden's total defence and the security situation, June 2026

Excerpts

The Defence Commission agrees on the main points of the report. In certain areas, members Morgan Johansson (S), Peter Hultqvist (S), Mikael Larsson (C), Hanna Gunnarsson (V) and Emma Berginger (MP) have expressed dissenting views.

1. Update on the security situation

The security situation remains serious and is characterised by significant uncertainty. There is still a risk of rapid deterioration with serious consequences for the security of Europe and Sweden. In a period of upheaval and transformation in security policy, Sweden needs to be prepared for further changes. The Commission notes that the security situation will not return to the state that prevailed prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

The geopolitical power struggle has intensified further since the Defence Resolution was adopted in December 2024, with noticeable consequences both globally and in Sweden's neighbourhood. Several states, both regionally and globally, are openly violating international norms and parts of the rules-based international order. Multilateral cooperation and institutions are being undermined. Russia and China advocate a world governed by great powers with spheres of influence, where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states are not respected.

Maintaining the rules-based international order founded on the UN Charter and respect for international law are a central and long-term foreign and security policy interest for Sweden. At a time when these principles are being eroded, Sweden should continue to work for international cooperation, with the UN playing a central role, as well as for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, including the right to determine their own security policy. Cohesion among Allies and partners in NATO and the EU who share values and respect international law and the concept of international cooperation is becoming even more important. The Defence Commission emphasises that it is in Sweden's interest to further deepen cooperation with like-minded partners both in the neighbourhood, across Europe and globally.

Today, the US is crucial to Swedish and European security and prosperity. Sweden's bilateral relationship with the US is broad and long-standing. At the same time, Europe's relationship with the US is changing. Under the current administration, US foreign and security policy has changed significantly. Its actions are characterised to a greater extent by unpredictability, rapid changes, transactionalism, harsher rhetoric and an increased propensity to use military force unilaterally, which on certain occasions has lacked support in international law.

Trade conflicts and intensifying competition over technology and raw materials have meant that the importance of trade, competitiveness, growth and economic security to security policy has become clearer.

The intensifying geopolitical power struggle makes it more difficult to manage cross-border threats and global challenges, such as climate change and its consequences. Climate change is a threat in itself. It increases international tensions and instability and exacerbates existing conflicts. Unless strong measures are taken to rapidly reduce global greenhouse emissions, the 1.5-degree target will be exceeded, which could accelerate negative consequences.

Rapid technological development, such as artificial intelligence, is having increasingly tangible security policy implications. Access to, and the ability to apply, emerging technologies are becoming increasingly essential to military and economic power dynamics.

Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Sweden and NATO. Russia's objective of dominating and controlling Ukraine

as a state, its perception of being in a protracted conflict with the West and western values, and its ambition to alter the European security order and the rules-based international order remain unchanged. The Defence Commission sees a risk that the confrontation between Russia and Europe will deepen further.

The Defence Commission emphasises that the threat from Russia will persist for a long time. The country continues to build up its military capabilities and, four years after the full-scale invasion, is waging a war in Ukraine with undiminished force. Since 2024, Russia has further increased its defence spending and adapted its economy for a long-term confrontation with the West. An aggressive Russia, with both the capability and the will to wage war over a long period, must therefore form the main reason for the development of Sweden's total defence. The gravity of the security situation reinforces the importance of urgently continuing the rearmament of Sweden's total defence.

The threat from Russia encompasses both military and non-military means. Sweden and its Allies are increasingly subjected to hybrid threats and attacks from Russian actors, and the situation may deteriorate further. Russia's use of hybrid means is characterised by its increasing risk appetite and recklessness. Sweden's ability to respond to crises, threats and hostile actions that fall short of armed attack needs to be strengthened. Sweden's resilience must be further strengthened. This requires that capabilities in both civil and military defence continue to increase rapidly.

Support to Ukraine is a key aspect of Swedish security and defence policy and the policy of constraint in relation to Russia. To strengthen Sweden's total defence and support Ukraine in the long term, Sweden must be prepared to allocate considerable resources over a long period, even after a possible cessation of direct hostilities.

The policy of constraint in relation to Russia permeates a wide range of areas, including the modernisation of Sweden's total defence, Sweden's integration into NATO, deepened defence and security cooperation with our partners, support to Ukraine, increased pressure on Russia including through sanctions, measures against countries that facilitate Russia's aggression, and the strengthening of Sweden's resilience. NATO's deterrence and collective defence are cornerstones of our strategy of constraint. The

EU is crucial to securing long-term and comprehensive support to Ukraine and for a robust sanctions policy towards Russia.

National capabilities within total defence will, based on our membership of NATO, be focused on defending Sweden and contributing to the defence of Allies against armed attacks. In light of the rapid and extensive changes in security policy in recent decades, the Defence Commission considers that this focus on sufficient national capability should apply in the long term and over time, even during periods when the international situation appears more favourable from a security perspective. It is not possible to satisfactorily restore total defence capability only once a risk has become a reality.

Together with the growth of total defence capability and Sweden's integration into NATO, the most important investment in our future stability and security is ensuring that Russia does not achieve its objectives in its war of aggression against Ukraine. The Defence Commission emphasises that, in order to strengthen total defence and support Ukraine in the long run, Sweden must be prepared to commit significant resources over a long period, even after a cessation of hostilities.

An armed attack against Sweden or its Allies cannot be ruled out. Nor can it be ruled out that military means, or further threats of such military means, can be directed against Sweden. Sweden is best defended within NATO.

Since the Defence Resolution was adopted in December 2024, Sweden's integration into NATO and participation in the defence Alliance's activities and planning have progressed in line with the principles governing Sweden's role as an Ally, as set out in the Defence Resolution. Sweden's overriding interest as an Ally is to uphold the political and military credibility of NATO's Article 5. The integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO, together with NATO's enhanced deterrence and defence measures, has strengthened the Alliance and Sweden's security.

Within NATO, the long-awaited redistribution of defence efforts, known as burden-sharing, between allies has begun and will accelerate in the coming years.

The Defence Commission emphasises the continued crucial importance of the transatlantic link, including the US's extended strategic deterrence, to European security. At the same time, the

Defence Commission notes that Europe must take significantly greater responsibility for its own security, and clarify the benefits that all allies derive from a strong defence alliance and transatlantic cooperation. The Commission's view of the US as a key Ally and bilateral partner remains unchanged. At the same time, the Commission considers that the bilateral relationship should continue to develop in line with Swedish interests and priorities.

Europe must bear the primary responsibility for the conventional forces required for the defence of NATO. However, the US's military commitment, both conventional and nuclear, remains of crucial importance, even though the US has announced that its contribution of conventional forces to the defence of Europe will be reduced. The US states that it will continue to maintain extended nuclear deterrence. The Defence Commission considers that Sweden should shoulder its share of this responsibility and work towards an orderly, solidarity-based and gradual redistribution of defence efforts within the Alliance.

With Russia as the pacing threat and the transatlantic link undergoing change, Europe needs to strengthen its defence capabilities, competitiveness and geopolitical role. Taking greater responsibility for its own security also makes Europe stronger globally. The importance of the EU and the rest of Europe to Sweden's security has increased. Security and defence cooperation within the Union is developing, and it is in Sweden's interests to actively engage in and influence the shaping of this cooperation. Sweden should also work to develop the EU cooperation and partnerships with like-minded countries within and outside Europe. Canada's foreign and security policy offers new conditions and opportunities for deeper cooperation in this regard

As part of our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East is strategically important for both the EU and NATO. The situation has escalated rapidly following the US and Israel's launch of their military attack on Iran, resulting in Iran attacking several countries in the region and closing the Strait of Hormuz. The actions of the US, Israel and Iran all contravene the UN Charter and lack support in international law.

The war has created great uncertainty, with significant and potentially long-term consequences for the global economy, including energy supply, food security, inflation and global trade. It

affects the entire international order and impacts Europe in ways that are difficult to predict, particularly economically, but also in terms of security. For example, the conflict risks benefiting Russia – economically through rising oil prices, and politically and militarily by diverting the international community’s attention from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and tying up resources in the Middle East.

The deteriorating global security situation has once again brought the question of the role of nuclear weapons to the fore. Multilateral cooperation on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is under severe pressure. It is in Sweden’s interest to continue to uphold and support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is a cornerstone of efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Sweden’s neighbourhood

There is a high degree of consensus on security policy among the countries in our neighbourhood, which is reflected in increased defence efforts and support to Ukraine. Sweden’s and Finland’s integration into NATO has continued, as has the development of NATO’s deterrence activities and defence measures along the northern and eastern flanks.

In the Baltic Sea region, there have been recurring incidents of sabotage, cyberattacks, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) jamming, violations and other incidents with various links to Russia. Russia’s risk-taking and recklessness have increased. It is assessed that, in the coming years, Russia will continue to use and develop methods for hybrid operations with the aim of influencing developments in Sweden’s neighbourhood that fall short of the threshold for armed attack.

The Defence Commission notes that threats to critical infrastructure across the entire conflict spectrum are serious and that essential services will be targets for hostile action in the event of war.

Allies that share a direct border with Russia are particularly vulnerable to Russian actions. Within the Alliance, Sweden plays a

key role in defending NATO's eastern flank. It is essential that allied territory in the Baltic Sea region, including the islands, can be defended and controlled by the Allies.

Several drone incidents occurred in the Baltic states and Finland during the spring of 2026 as a consequence of Russia's war against Ukraine. In Poland, Lithuania and Romania, drone incidents have taken place in connection with Russian long-range strikes.

The Baltic Sea region is also of great importance to Russian trade, particularly for the export of fossil fuels. Revenue from oil and gas exports is the primary source of income for Russia's war in Ukraine. To circumvent sanctions and continue exporting crude oil, for example, Russia has established a network of vessels with unclear ownership structures. To restrict this mode of export, the EU has so far placed nearly 600 vessels and several strategically important Russian oil ports on its sanctions list, and has begun to target the individuals and companies facilitating the network. The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of taking further measures to stop the Russian shadow fleet within the framework of the law of the sea and other applicable law.

Within NATO, Sweden's responsibility for its neighbourhood is expressed through operations involving units in the land, sea and air domains, and support for security-enhancing activities within the framework of the Alliance's ongoing activities and operations. Sweden contributes to NATO's Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Latvia, Baltic Sentry operation, Standing Naval Forces, Air Policing, air defence operations in Poland, Eastern Sentry operation and tactical naval headquarters in Rostock (Commander Task Force Baltic, CTF). Sweden is the framework nation for FLF Finland, and contributes to NATO's Arctic Sentry operation, established in 2026.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of continuing to deepen relations with allies and partners in the neighbourhood. Cooperation within the informal Nordic and Nordic-Baltic foreign and security policy formats involving the five Nordic countries (N5) and the eight Nordic-Baltic countries (NB8) has intensified. As regards Nordic defence cooperation, this has been further deepened. This cooperation focuses, among other things, on enabling joint operations and defence materiel cooperation and capability development, with NATO's capability

goals as the starting point. Such cooperation enhances the conditions for joint operational action and should be long-term. It is of great importance that Sweden takes responsibility for deepening regional cooperation within the framework of NATO, which also contributes to greater depth in terms of interoperability.

The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF), the Håga Cooperation and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) are examples of formats that are important for Sweden. Bilateral cooperation with the US, the UK, France, Germany and Poland is also of particular importance to Sweden and the neighbourhood. The Defence Commission emphasises that it is in Sweden's interests to further deepen cooperation with like-minded partners in the neighbourhood, Northern Europe and globally.

The Arctic's increased security policy and military strategic importance is expressly reflected in Swedish security and defence policy. Sweden supports an increased NATO presence and vigilance in the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, Sweden acts in cooperation with other Arctic NATO Allies. Sweden plays a leading role in FLETC Finland and contributes to NATO's Arctic Sentry operation.

Russia and its full-scale aggression against Ukraine

The Defence Commission reiterates the importance of continuing to constrain Russia's strategic scope for action. Sweden, together with other Allies and partners, will proceed with robust political, economic, diplomatic, legal and military measures to constrain Russia's aggression. This includes measures for deterrence and defence, accountability, comprehensive sanctions, political and economic isolation, and support to Ukraine.

Domestic repression in Russia has increased since 2022. Segments of Russian society are being increasingly subjected to ideological control and sophisticated war propaganda aimed at preparing the population for a protracted and demanding confrontation with the West. The Russian narrative asserts that Russia will inevitably win the war in Ukraine, either by military means or through negotiations. At the same time, Russia has suffered heavy losses in terms of personnel and equipment and made relatively minor military gains.

The Defence Commission emphasises that the outcome of the war will be decisive for how Europe's security takes shape in the future. Should Russia succeed in achieving its objectives, it would deal a fundamental blow to the European security order and affect global security and the balance of power.

The Defence Commission stresses that strong, predictable and sustained support to Ukraine is our primary means of constraining Russia's scope for action. Strong international support will continue to place high demands on unity, robustness and determination from the countries supporting Ukraine. Long-term perseverance is of vital importance and will remain so even after the cessation of direct hostilities. The continued cohesion of the West and the EU is a key factor for this perseverance, both in terms of sanctions against Russia and support to Ukraine. The Defence Commission sees a need for a more even distribution of expenditure among the countries supporting Ukraine. The Defence Commission considers that more countries should increase their support.

The Defence Commission notes that Ukraine has developed into a significant security policy actor and partner in Europe, and possesses unique and extensive military experience in defending itself against Russia.

Alongside ongoing support, the EU's most important contribution to Ukraine's long-term security is a credible EU accession process and EU membership. The Defence Commission believes that Sweden should actively contribute to Ukraine becoming a member of the EU and NATO. Future Ukrainian membership of the EU and NATO would strengthen European security and contribute to Ukraine's development.

Europe's global role and EU cooperation

With Russia posing the pacing threat, and the transatlantic link undergoing change, the Defence Commission notes that it is of crucial importance for Europe to strengthen its defence capabilities, competitiveness and geopolitical role. Taking greater responsibility for its own security also makes Europe stronger on the global stage.

There is no other multinational actor that matches the EU's combined tools in terms of diplomacy, trade, development

assistance, the Common Security and Defence Policy, sanctions and, where applicable, the enlargement process. By combining and strengthening these tools in the best possible way, the EU can play a key role in bolstering security, resilience and stability in Europe, in its neighbourhood and globally, to safeguard international law, peace and security.

European countries have begun strengthening their national defence forces and transitioning to taking on greater responsibility within NATO. The EU is Sweden's primary foreign policy arena, and the Union's importance to Sweden's security has increased. European countries have begun strengthening their national armed forces and transitioning to taking on greater responsibility within NATO. Europe is shouldering the main responsibility for supporting Ukraine and has in recent years has demonstrated its ability to act collectively and forcefully when its interests have been threatened.

Defence industrial issues and capability-building measures have in recent years moved higher up the political agenda in Europe, having previously been addressed only marginally. The issue of radically increasing European production capacity, breaking cost curves and strengthening innovation capacity is important for NATO's ability to make deterrence credible. The Defence Commission emphasises that the EU and individual countries have a key role to play in this work.

The Defence Commission emphasises the EU's central role both in the continued support to Ukraine and in the overall policy of constraining Russia. As the Commission has previously noted, the EU's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been historic for the Union in terms of both scope and speed, with significant political, economic, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, as well as sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The Defence Commission emphasises the EU's central role both in continued support to Ukraine and in the overall policy of constraining Russia.

As the Defence Commission has previously emphasised, Sweden should continue to play an active and assertive role in ensuring united, strong, predictable and long-term EU support to Ukraine – whether it be military, political, economic or humanitarian – and in pursuing tougher sanctions against Russia. Sweden must continue to

work towards a solution whereby frozen Russian assets can be used to finance support to Ukraine. The need for external financing is substantial and long-term.

The unpredictable geopolitical situation increases the need to cooperate more with others. Several countries and regions outside Europe are looking to the EU for partnership. The Defence Commission notes that the EU gains further influence by deepening cooperation within Europe, with Canada and with other like-minded countries.

US engagement in Europe

Since the end of the Second World War, the US has been the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security. US conventional military capabilities form the backbone of NATO. Extended strategic deterrence, based on combined conventional and nuclear capabilities, has been and remains of crucial importance to the security of Europe and Sweden. At the same time, Europe's relationship with the US is changing. US foreign and security policy is undergoing a shift in focus towards the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific region. This change has been accentuated under the current administration. This behaviour has also been characterised, in part, by greater unpredictability, rapid changes, transactionalism and harsher rhetoric, and has on certain occasions lacked support in international law.

Sweden's relationship with the US is, and remains, broad and long-term. The Commission's view of the US as a key Ally and bilateral partner remains unchanged. The Defence Commission emphasises the continued crucial importance of the transatlantic link, including the US's extended strategic deterrence, to European security. At the same time, the Defence Commission notes that Europe's relationship with the US is entering a new era. It is in Europe's interests to take significantly greater responsibility for its own security, and to clarify the benefits that all Allies derive from a strong defence alliance and transatlantic cooperation. At the same time, the Commission considers that the bilateral relationship should continue to develop in line with Swedish interests and priorities.

The Trump administration has significantly altered the US's foreign and security policy principles and priorities, with an increased emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and the defence of its own homeland. The US National Security Strategy criticises, among other things, Europe's economic policy, democratic development, freedom of expression and migration policy. At the same time, it is noted that Europe remains of strategic importance to the US in certain respects. Russia is described as a persistent but manageable threat, primarily to NATO's eastern member countries. Dealing with the conventional threat from Russia is seen primarily as Europe's responsibility, whilst the US retains its responsibility for nuclear deterrence.

The shift in US foreign and security policy has also entailed a changed approach towards Allies. Demands for greater European security responsibility have been consistently put forward by previous administrations over a long period, but current actions and rhetoric are in many respects new and will entail concrete changes in US force deployments.

At the end of 2025, the current US administration revisited the demands on Greenland that it had already signalled upon taking office that same year. The US thereby threatened Denmark's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Sweden fully supports Denmark's territorial integrity and the right of the Greenlandic people to self-determination. In this context, the Defence Commission once again emphasises the importance of maintaining the rules-based international order and respect for international law.

The Defence Commission notes the changes in the US administration's attitude towards Russia as expressed in its new security and defence strategies and in the policy pursued since taking office. US commitment to joint sanctions and sanctions as a means of exerting pressure on Russia has waned, but the picture is not clear-cut.

The Defence Commission emphasises that the direction of foreign and security policy and the transatlantic engagement chosen by the US in the coming years will be of great significance for Swedish and European security. Greater European responsibility for its own security is an important aspect of the long-term relationship with the US.

The military-strategic situation

At the NATO Summit in The Hague in 2025, the Alliance agreed on a new commitment that all Allies should, by 2035, allocate 5 per cent of GDP annually to expenditure on basic military requirements and defence and security-related expenditure. The decision was taken to address the threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security and the threat of terrorism. The decision means that, by 2035, all Allies must allocate at least 3.5 per cent of GDP annually, in accordance with NATO's agreed definition of defence expenditure, to provide resources to meet core defence requirements and to meet NATO capability targets. In addition, up to 1.5 per cent of GDP annually is to be allocated to, among other things, the protection of critical infrastructure and information and communications systems, measures to strengthen societal resilience and civil preparedness, and investments in innovation and a strengthened defence industrial base. In the same year, the Allies adopted significantly more demanding capability targets. European Allies must also adapt their armed forces to a situation where US commitments to NATO's defence are subject to reallocation, and the conventional defence of Europe becomes primarily a task for the European Allies. This process has begun but will, in comparison with current commitments, place greater demands on Sweden, other European Allies and Canada.

Russia is gradually increasing its military capability in Sweden's neighbourhood. The Defence Commission assesses that Russia's actions in and outside Ukraine will continue to be characterised by a high political and military risk appetite and a high tolerance for its own losses.

Russian military advances, for example to test NATO's cohesion and the credibility of Article 5, could take place in the relatively near future if the Kremlin assesses that the political conditions are favourable, even if the military balance of power does not meet traditional requirements for an attack.

Reorganisation and expansion of the Russian ground forces has begun but can only be completed after a possible cessation of active Russian military operations in Ukraine. This means that it may take one or more years before new large-scale ground operations can be launched. However, the rebuilding process has begun and is taking

place against the backdrop of several years of combat experience against a capable adversary. Furthermore, key elements of the Russian armed forces have been relatively unaffected by the war, particularly resources for hybrid warfare, the air force, the navy (except in the Black Sea) and long-range strike capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

2. Nato membership

Sweden's membership of NATO is based on the conviction that our security is best safeguarded within the framework of an alliance of like-minded nations. NATO is Sweden's most important defence policy arena. The collective defence commitment within NATO is a cornerstone of Swedish security and defence policy. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the deteriorating security situation in Europe, NATO's activities have focused on strengthening defence capabilities and providing support to Ukraine.

Fair distribution of defence efforts (burden-sharing) among the Allies is key to, among other things, strengthening cohesion within the Alliance. The US is striving to achieve a distribution of defence efforts in which European Allies take greater responsibility for the defence of Europe. European Allies therefore need to expand, adapt and develop their armed forces in anticipation of a situation where US commitments to NATO's defence are subject to redeployment and the conventional defence of Europe becomes primarily a matter for the European Allies. This applies to both defence spending and military capabilities and is also expected to gradually affect staffing levels within NATO's military structures. Since the current US administration took office, the US has, to a greater extent than before, made burden-sharing a top priority and demanded that the process be accelerated. At the same time, the US has reiterated that it intends to continue to provide extended nuclear deterrence and certain critical capabilities.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of increased European responsibility for common security and that the conventional defence of Europe must increasingly be seen as a responsibility primarily for European Allies going forward. As an

Ally, Sweden must shoulder its share of this responsibility and work towards an orderly, solidarity-based and gradual redistribution of defence efforts. This is also an investment in the transatlantic link and in cooperation with the US.

In light of this change, NATO's defence must be adapted. The Allies need to begin working on how NATO , will ensure a strong defence of Europe and thereby safeguard the conventional aspect of deterrence following a reorientation of support from conventional US forces. A protracted war with Russia must be the baseline factor for such a defence and take into account the specific circumstances and limitations of the European Allies and Canada, including geographical, technical, industrial and resource-related factors. Such a defence, in which Europe assumes greater responsibility, cannot be based entirely on the US's concept of warfare against a sophisticated adversary. At the same time, the ability to maintain interoperability with the US is a prerequisite for the Alliance's collective capability.

The Defence Commission also emphasises the importance of this rebalancing being proportionate and of all Allies assuming their share of responsibilities, fully aware that defence spending by European countries will consequently need to increase in order to meet the commitments of the agreement concluded at the Hague Summit. This is a prerequisite for meeting NATO's overall defence capability requirements and is vital to maintaining unity within the Alliance. Sweden is one of the countries which, due to its geographical location, has much to lose if the defence efforts of European Allies are diluted.

In light of the assessed threat that posed by Russia, NATO has gradually strengthened its collective defence by taking a series of measures to enhance its capabilities, including adopting new regional defence plans, an expanded presence along the eastern flank, a new force model and a strengthened command structure. On the naval front, NATO is conducting the Baltic Sentry operation in the Baltic Sea with the aim of strengthening maritime surveillance and deterring sabotage of critical underwater infrastructure. Following repeated violations of allied airspace in 2025, the Eastern Sentry air defence operation was launched. Moreover, in light of security challenges in the Arctic, the Arctic Sentry operation commenced in February 2026.

Since 2016, NATO has established eight multinational FLF battlegroups along its eastern flank. The eight battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary make up NATO's forward presence and can, if necessary, be expanded to brigade strength in each of these countries. Sweden participates in the FLF in Latvia.

At the NATO summit in Washington in 2024, the Alliance agreed to establish a forward presence in Finland. Sweden is the framework nation and leads FLF Finland. This battlegroup will help to strengthen the Alliance's capabilities and deterrence on the northern flank. It is being established in 2026 and will be developed gradually over the coming years. As the framework nation, Sweden has a special responsibility for the force's resource allocation. The Swedish battalion battlegroup, which forms the core of the force to be deployed in Finland, will initially be based in Boden. A multinational headquarters element will be located in Rovaniemi.

NATO's deterrence and collective defence are underpinned by the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). The purpose of the NDPP is to harmonise the Allies' national capability planning and capability development, thereby making military capabilities available to carry out NATO's core tasks. The NDPP also emphasises civilian capabilities to withstand attacks and support military operations. The NDPP is a four-year cycle and entails cooperation between NATO headquarters and individual nations throughout the cycle.

For Sweden, NATO's 2025 capability targets cover all branches of the armed forces and joint functions. For the period up to 2031, the capability targets assigned to Sweden by the other Allies cover the following main points:

- Develop a multinational divisional command with associated divisional units in cooperation with Norway.
- Develop three heavy infantry brigades and one light infantry brigade.
 - Improve the Navy's interoperability and its ability to redeploy.
 - Improve the Air Force's interoperability, readiness and ability to redeploy.
- Develop the capability to contribute to and operate within an integrated air and missile defence system, including air defence units.

- Develop the capability to enable military operations in the region and provide host nation support.

In the period after 2031, the capability objectives include the following main points:

- Develop digitally supported combat units, capable of conducting fully interoperable multi-domain operations.

- Develop the mobility, firepower and sensors of ground units.

- Complete the remaining requirements for air defence units.

- Develop future anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including the use of maritime helicopters.

- Continue the development of the Air Force, focusing on the introduction of new capabilities such as aerial refuelling, suppression of enemy air defences and extended combat range.

The capability objectives also entail a need for extensive ammunition procurement. The capability targets assigned to Sweden are in line with the war organisation decided upon by the Riksdag in December 2024. The war organisation thus forms the basis for the capability targets. Compared with the ambition level set out in the Defence Resolution, however, additional resources are required to achieve the capability targets within the given timeframes in terms of concrete content and ambition. The direction announced in the Budget Bill for 2026 regarding increased resources for military defence for 2026–2035 allows for additional resources to address this to some extent.

The Defence Commission emphasises that NATO membership entails high standards, requiring that combat-ready and well-trained units be made available to the Alliance. The serious international situation means that increasing the pace of combat unit production must continue to be prioritised. This is necessary to ensure that the Alliance has the combat units required to carry out its operational plans and to act as a deterrent. The ability to mobilise in accordance with established requirements is a prerequisite for Sweden's contribution to NATO's collective defence.

Military forces depend on civilian support to carry out their missions, including in terms of transport, communications, energy and basic supplies such as food and drinking water. Civilian measures and preparations aim to ensure that these areas can withstand attacks or disruptions and continue to provide support for NATO's military operations. In recent years, the Allies have

gradually agreed to deepen and strengthen the focus of their work on societal resilience and civil preparedness.

Sweden's integration into NATO

Sweden's ability to support other Allies, including through host nation support, is crucial to the Alliance's ability to operate in our part of Europe. By enabling early action even in peacetime, Sweden can help to strengthen collective defence and thereby NATO's overall deterrence.

Since joining NATO, Sweden has contributed to strengthening NATO's collective defence, and thus its overall deterrent capability. This has been achieved through continued integration into NATO's planning and structures, as well as through concrete contributions to NATO operations and other activities. Through its expertise on Russia, Sweden has also helped shape NATO policy towards Russia.

The Defence Commission emphasises that Sweden's geostrategic position and security policy interests must continue to form the basis for shaping Sweden's role as an Ally, as stated in the Defence Commission's 2023 security policy report (DS 2023:19) and in the 2024 Defence Resolution. A key task is to facilitate and participate effectively in the collective defence of Northern Europe in accordance with joint operational planning. This includes a solidarity-based responsibility that primarily focuses on the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic, with the specific expertise required for operations in these environments.

Based on the above, Sweden has established a clear profile within the Alliance as a member that contributes credibly to collective security. Readiness to contribute capabilities and resources at short notice to high-priority initiatives and operations, and to the support to Ukraine coordinated via NATO, has helped to strengthen Sweden's influence.

Sweden is a driving force in ensuring that the Alliance, within the scope of its responsibilities, takes and coordinates measures to counter Russia's ambitions for power. NATO's collective defence and deterrence capability is a key part of the Alliance's strategy to constrain Russia's scope of action.

Sweden has worked to maintain cohesion within the Alliance and constrain the threat from Russia by encouraging Europe and Canada to take greater responsibility for collective security. Sweden has also prioritised NATO's support to Ukraine and is working to ensure that NATO remains a key player in supporting Ukraine. The NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which enables allied and partner countries to pay for packages of US defence materiel for Ukraine, will need to be expanded, and more Allies need to contribute.

Sweden's military contributions to NATO have included units in the land, sea and air domains, as well as support for security-enhancing operations within the framework of the Alliance's ongoing activities and operations. In 2025, Sweden contributed to the multinational brigade in Latvia (FLF Latvia), NATO's Standing Naval Forces, Baltic Sentry, NATO's air policing, the air defence operation in Poland, and Eastern Sentry, the joint NATO activity to protect the eastern flank of member countries against, among other things, unmanned aerial vehicles. In 2026, Sweden has rotated a new ground unit to FLF Latvia, participated in air policing over Iceland, contributed fighter aircraft to NATO's Arctic Sentry, and continued to provide support to Baltic Sentry in the Baltic Sea. Sweden continues to contribute to collective defence through the Swedish Armed Forces' war organisation within the NATO Force Model. As the framework nation FLF Finland, Sweden leads the work in close consultation with the host nation Finland, NATO's military authorities and Allies. Sweden has also, together with other Arctic Allies and like-minded partners, worked to increase the focus on the strategic importance of the Arctic and the North Calotte and to strengthen NATO's role.

The Alliance will continue to be tested in the hybrid domain. Russia is an aggressive actor in this area and will continue to subject Allies to influence activities that fall short of the threshold of armed attack. Hybrid operations against Allies may also reach the level of armed attack and lead to the invocation of Article 5. As an Ally, Sweden contributes to NATO's work in addressing the broad threat scenario.

3. Total defence

Sweden's total defence consists of military activities (military defence) and civilian activities (civil defence). Sweden's total defence is based on the collective resources of society.

Defending Sweden and its Allies against armed attacks and upholding our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity is not only a military task but also a responsibility for the whole of society. Total defence requires personal contributions from all residents. This presupposes a committed population in which everyone is expected to contribute.

Ultimately, the foundation of Sweden's total defence is its population. Each and every one of us has a role to play in total defence. Ukraine has clearly demonstrated how the resilience and willingness of the population to defend themselves are crucial to withstanding an attack. The population's willingness to defend, resilience and ability to cope with a wartime situation are essential prerequisites for a credible total defence.

The Defence Commission considers that upholding our country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity is a vital national security interest. We are prepared, if necessary, to use military force to defend our country, our people, our democracy, our freedom and our way of life.

Our national total defence capability, based on our membership of NATO, must be geared towards defending Sweden and helping to defend Allies against armed attacks. This also strengthens our ability to manage crises in peacetime.

In light of the rapid and extensive changes in security policy over recent decades, the Defence Commission considers that this focus on sufficient national capability should apply in the long term and over time, even during longer periods when the international situation appears more favourable from a security perspective. It is not possible to satisfactorily restore total defence capability only once a crisis or war has become a reality.

Sweden's total defence must have such strength, composition, command, preparedness and endurance that it can act as a deterrent to war and thus be preventive and peacekeeping. A strong Swedish total defence with credible defence capability strengthens NATO's collective defence and thus the overall deterrent capability. The

fundamental resilience of society and its ability to withstand peacetime crises contribute to the war-detering effect.

The gravity of the security situation underscores the importance of urgently continuing the rearmament of Sweden's total defence. Achieving a relevant overall total defence capability will require continued determination and perseverance. It is essential that the development of total defence is accorded great importance when weighing up and prioritising different societal interests. Significant resources will be allocated to military and civil defence during the 2025–2030 Defence Resolution period. With a higher level of ambition and increased funding, it is essential that the allocated resources be used effectively and achieve the intended results.

Realising the defence policy direction developed with broad political consensus forms the basis for both the defence bill and the work of the Defence Commission. The Defence Commission notes that the development of Sweden total defence is urgent and rests on a broad political foundation. The Defence Commission considers this consensus to be a strength. A broad political foundation also provides stability and the conditions for long-term planning and continued growth within total defence across electoral periods. The Defence Commission regards it as a strength that the total defence initiatives in a budget bill do not have a clear party-political orientation but are based on political consensus.

The current approach is that military and civil defence, within the framework of a coherent total defence, should prepare and plan for the ability to meet and manage a war in Europe for at least three months that leads to serious consequences for the functioning of society. As the Defence Commission has previously noted, these three months give society time to adapt to wartime conditions.

In the 2024 Defence Resolution, the Government set out the fundamental readiness requirements for the military defence. These require the Swedish Armed Forces, with its entire war organisation, to be able to carry out wartime tasks within one week of a decision on heightened readiness and general mobilisation. Based on these readiness requirements, the Swedish Armed Forces established a new readiness system in 2025 that is compatible with the readiness requirements adopted by NATO Allies.

Heightened readiness levels are often a prerequisite for securing more extensive support from civil defence for military defence. The

Swedish regulatory framework for heightened readiness requires planning, in both military and civil defence, with different readiness levels for different situations.

Decisions on heightened readiness as a result of changes in the security situation are a political responsibility. The Government may, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 15 of the Instrument of Government and the Act on Total Defence and Heightened Alert (1992:1403), decide on heightened preparedness if Sweden is at risk of war or if there are prevailing exceptional circumstances arising from war beyond Sweden's borders or from Sweden having been at war or at risk of war. What constitutes war or a risk of war is not defined in Swedish legislative text and is thus ultimately determined by the Government. The legislative history indicates that the broad scope of the Government's powers is justified by the very special situations in which decisions on heightened preparedness are intended to be taken.

The Defence Commission considers that there are grounds to consider reviewing of this 'empowering legislation' with a view to analysing whether any part of the regulatory framework needs to be amended to meet the conditions of contemporary society, and whether there is a need to allow for its application even during serious peacetime crises.

4. Civil defence

A strong civil defence dimensioned for war is essential to ensure that Sweden's total defence, as part of NATO's collective defence, can contribute to NATO's overall deterrence capability and thus to peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

The security situation is serious and characterised by significant uncertainty. There remains a risk of rapid deterioration with serious consequences for the security of Europe and Sweden. Sweden must take full account of the consequences of the international situation and increase the pace and determination with which it builds up its civil defence.

Civil defence capabilities have been gradually strengthened since 2015, when total defence planning was resumed. However, the rebuilding process began from a low level, and it was not until after

2020 that financial resources were allocated to any significant extent. It should also be noted that the benchmark threat scenario and the requirements that civil defence must be able to meet have increased over time.

Since the 2024 Defence Resolution, Sweden's civil defence has continued to develop. A number of measures have been taken and several areas of civil defence have been strengthened, not least financially. However, much work remains to be done and situations may arise that affect the implementation of the agreed direction. The build-up is not yet sufficient to meet the requirements imposed by the current security situation.

Essential public services and critical infrastructure that are necessary for total defence must be safeguarded through a combination of protective measures and the ability to restore and repair damaged or disrupted functions. In some cases, protective measures may consist of active protection against air attacks, in the form of, for example, air defence systems. In the continued development of the Swedish Armed Forces' air defence capability, consideration must also be given to the need to protect certain particularly important civilian targets. In a wartime situation, there will be a need to prioritise which civilian and military targets can be protected in a given situation.

In many cases, however, passive protective measures will be the main option. The Defence Commission notes that it will be impossible to protect all essential public services and critical infrastructure. It is therefore of great importance that the capability to repair and restore the functionality of damaged and disabled critical infrastructure is rapidly strengthened and developed. Essential public services and critical infrastructure that are necessary for total defence need to be identified so that measures can be taken to ensure that these functions can be maintained in the event of war.

Governance and monitoring of civil defence

The financial resources allocated to civil defence since the 2024 Defence Resolution represent a substantial increase. As resources for civil defence increase, coordination and oversight of civil defence funding must be ensured. Clearer performance requirements within

total defence create the conditions for setting more concrete targets that can be monitored.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of more emergency preparedness authorities being tasked with developing benchmark targets. This will also provide the Government with better conditions for steering towards the agreed level of ambition for civil defence capability. The work on developing benchmark targets should be linked to efforts to develop performance indicators for civil defence.

The Defence Commission recalls the proposals in its 2023 total defence report (Ds 2023:34) regarding the introduction of a new funding structure for civil defence. The demands for rapid growth in total defence have since increased further, and significant funds have been allocated to civil defence. The Defence Commission considers that there is still reason to consider how financial governance can best be designed to contribute to effective governance and monitoring of a rapid rearmament of Sweden's civil defence.

Command structure and organisation

Total defence requires command structures that, in peacetime, can ensure coherent planning so that operations can be carried out even under the most difficult conditions. In the event of a heightened state of alert or war, the command structures must ensure that society's collective resources can be allocated, directed, prioritised and coordinated to achieve the greatest possible defence effect.

The preparedness structure for civil defence introduced in 2022 means that the foundation for building greater capability is partly in place but must continue to be developed.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of a clear command structure for civil defence and of clear interaction between geographical areas of responsibility and central emergency preparedness authorities. Designated authorities require strengthened mandates to ensure coordination and prioritisation across different sectors of society and levels of command with geographical responsibility.

Alongside the public administration, activities carried out by private actors are of great significance to society's capability during

a heightened state of alert and war. It is imperative that efforts to identify the need for stronger and clearer governance of private actors in various sectors of society are intensified, and that regulations tailored to their specific conditions are developed.

A prerequisite for an effective command structure is that the information necessary for decision-making is available in times of peace, crisis and war. Necessary technical and physical conditions for sharing information in a robust and secure manner between actors in total defence are essential.

Municipalities and regions play a crucial role in ensuring the functionality of society during a heightened state of alert and war. Clarified requirements for municipalities' and regions' contingency planning regarding support for Sweden's military defence need to be addressed in the ongoing work.

Several essential public services currently fall outside civil preparedness sectors. It is essential that, within these essential public services, responsibility has been designated for planning and coordination of contingency measures. The Defence Commission considers that this work must continue.

Personnel supply

It is important that emergency preparedness authorities and other actors within civil defence continue their efforts to ensure a robust personnel supply to their war organisations, for example through military deployment.

Total defence must be viewed as a whole, where available personnel are allocated in a rational manner and the needs of various parts of total defence are weighed against one another. With the reintroduction of civilian service and an increasing number of individuals being deployed, there is a growing need to clarify procedures in the event of conflicts of interest between two personnel managers who wish to recruit the same individual. The Defence Commission is still of the opinion that a special civil preparedness sector or function for labour supply should be established.

Voluntary engagement is a key part of both our democratic society and our overall defence capability and will to defend the

country. Voluntary defence organisations also increase interest and knowledge in areas important to total defence. It is important that public interest and engagement in voluntary defence organisations are nurtured. The voluntary defence organisations require relevant infrastructure to carry out their activities. Contract personnel who have a role in civil defence must be trained.

Civil service is a tool for ensuring the supply of personnel that cannot be met by other means. The Defence Commission notes that several authorities have been given government assignments to investigate the need for civil service. The Defence Commission has previously emphasised the importance of speed in these matters and that further decisions regarding civil preparedness sectors relevant to civil service may need to be taken, a need that remains.

In the event of war on Swedish territory, existing demands on regular police operations will increase, and the police will also face additional demands. The Defence Commission wishes to emphasise that the creation of a police reinforcement resource is a matter of urgency.

The Defence Commission considers that the issue of the police's status under international law should be addressed without delay. Account should be taken of the circumstances arising from the serious security situation. The resources of the Swedish Police Authority should be used as effectively as possible to strengthen total defence.

Security of supply

Clearer lines of responsibility that are now in place create the conditions for building capacity and capability. Initial steps to secure goods and services during periods of a heightened state of alert and in the event of war have been taken in a few civil preparedness sectors, such as health and medical care and food supply. However, this work is in an early stage, and there is, for the most part, a lack of concrete capability and resilience through preparedness stockpiles, tailored agreements and other measures to ensure resilience during heightened a state of alert and war. Measures for security of supply need to be adapted to the actual conditions of each sector.

A fundamental prerequisite for robust security of supply is that supply analyses are carried out. It is necessary to continue developing a structure in which Sweden's need for the supply of critical goods and services can be identified, with the aim of providing comprehensive knowledge of Sweden's security of supply capacity and need for measures.

It is important to utilise the business sector's engagement, and that there are favourable conditions for the business sector to participate in the collective effort to strengthen total defence. The Defence Commission notes that the conditions for financing investments in the resilience of private actors need to be established in additional civil preparedness sectors.

A key issue for security of supply is how cooperation between the public sector and the business sector will be ensured and structured. The Defence Commission notes that the authorities' work on concluding agreements aimed at maintaining the supply of goods and services necessary for priority tasks during peacetime crises and heightened alert must be closely monitored. It is also important to consider whether forms of cooperation need to be supplemented in any respect in order to strengthen security of supply.

The Defence Commission notes that there needs to be a stable foundation for contractual relationships between the public sector and the business sector. However, the legal framework for engaging companies in measures that need to be taken to prepare for a situation of heightened alert and war is relatively sound. Nevertheless, it must be considered whether further mandatory legislation should specify the obligations of companies, with the aim of promoting security of supply.

The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of quickly addressing the legal and practical issues concerning rationing. The Defence Commission considers that Sweden should work to establish deeper Nordic cooperation on security of supply with the other Nordic countries. The Defence Commission notes that it is important that the conditions are in place for a system of war insurance to be activated and applied during heightened alert and war.

Construction and repair preparedness

Ukraine's experiences underline the importance of the ability to rapidly repair both military and civilian infrastructure to ensure essential functionality.

A strengthened ability to repair and restore critical infrastructure is central to Sweden's entire total defence. Conditions must be created for a modern construction and repair preparedness for the overall needs of total defence.

Community planning, as well as physical planning, must take into account the requirements of total defence. It is essential that significant emphasis is given the development of total defence when weighing up and prioritising various societal interests.

Protecting the civilian population

The ability to maintain a functioning system for protection of the population (protective shelters, protective spaces, evacuation and invacuation, and warning systems) enables the survival of the civilian population and also helps to maintain the population's resilience and will to defend itself.

It is of central importance that the system for protection of civilians is appropriate for the entire population. People with disabilities are more vulnerable and face a higher risk of harm in crises than the rest of the population. The protection of civilians must continue to be managed as a coherent system comprising protective shelters, protective spaces, evacuation and invacuation, and warning systems. Such a systemic perspective can better facilitate the appropriate measures that need to be taken for people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups.

Psychological defence and the will to defend

Strengthening and maintaining the population's will to defend the country is a core task of psychological defence. The Defence Commission notes that psychological defence comprises three main elements: ensuring the population's resilience and will to defend, ensuring that factual public information can be communicated

quickly and effectively even under disrupted conditions, and preventing, identifying, analysing and countering influence campaigns.

The population's sense of belonging to and its participation in society is of great importance for the will to defend and the will to participate in and invest in total defence.

The work to strengthen psychological defence and the will to defend is thus a task that, like total defence in general, requires commitment across several areas of policy and society.

The media play a vital role in society's ability to manage crises and a heightened state of alert. A strong public service broadcasting in peacetime, with a high level of public trust and a broad geographical coverage, lays the foundations for the role of public service broadcasters in times of heightened state of alert.

Public service broadcasters have important preparedness tasks consisting in being able to warn and inform the public via radio and television. Terrestrial networks for radio and television broadcasting have long been of particular importance in ensuring this capability.

The Defence Commission notes continuous efforts are required to safeguard and strengthen the will to defend the country, the resilience of the population and trust in our society.

Ensuring the most essential public services

In June 2025, an agreement was reached between all parties in the Riksdag to meet NATO's new defence spending targets, which were agreed upon by the Allies at the Summit in The Hague in June 2025. Under the agreement, a deviation from the target for the public sector's net lending is permitted during the period 2026-2034. Additional funding for defence, temporarily financed through loans, may amount to a maximum of SEK 300 billion, of which a maximum of SEK 50 billion may be used for investments in physical infrastructure and the stockpiling of food, medicines and fuel as part of civil defence. Temporary loan financing enables a faster modernisation of the Swedish defence sector without other expenditure being squeezed out or major tax increases being implemented.

Of the SEK 50 billion, the Government decided to allocate approximately SEK 11 billion in connection with the Budget Bill for 2026 to enable several investments. In the Spring Amending Budget

for 2026 a further allocation of approximately SEK 180 million was decided upon for 2026 in the areas of transport infrastructure and energy supply. Moreover, in the Spring Amending Budget for 2026, an estimated SEK 1.85 billion will be allocated to the ongoing work to establish the new Rakel Generation2 national communications system. In addition, in the Spring Budget Bill for 2026 an estimated SEK 30 billion should be allocated for investments in transport infrastructure for the years 2026-2034.

5. Military defence

Sweden must adapt to the international situation and technological developments, including the development of Russian capabilities since the full-scale invasion, and act with increased pace and determination in building up its military defence. Technological developments are advancing rapidly. The war in Ukraine, for example, is driving the development of various unmanned systems as well as the integration of AI into military applications.

In the 2024 Defence Resolution, the Government notes that the build-up of defence is taking place from a low level. The starting point for this build-up has subsequently proved in several respects to be worse than previously indicated, particularly regarding the status and availability of the Armed Forces' materiel.

Under the 2024 Defence Resolution, measures previously deprioritised for financial reasons can be reinstated, such as the initiated introduction of long-range strike capability in the Air Force, the arming of surface combat vessels with air defence missiles and the initial development of rocket artillery capability. Like the Defence Commission, the Government emphasised that measures that enhance the capability of approved combat units must be prioritised first and foremost.

The 2024 Defence Resolution is Sweden's first defence resolution since becoming a member of NATO. The Defence Resolution therefore stipulated that the military defence should now be designed and dimensioned to counter an armed attack against Sweden and to contribute to the defence of Allies as part of NATO's collective defence. In 2025, Sweden was assigned capability targets by the other Allies. The targets were based on the war organisation

set out in the 2024 Defence Resolution, but with additional quantitative and qualitative specifications, where the degree of fulfilment varies in certain areas. In addition to the war organisation, the capability targets also cover units and capabilities not included in the 2024 Defence Resolution. This is partly a consequence of areas of deficiency identified within the Alliance and Sweden's allocation to address these. In addition to the capability targets assigned by Allies, certain national capabilities must also be ensured. The capability targets influence the structure and content of the war organisation in both the short and long term.

The Defence Commission notes, however, that the agreed financial frameworks and the conditions underpinning the Swedish Armed Forces' current planning are not sufficient to fully meet the capability targets assigned to Sweden in 2025. Sweden shares shortcomings in meeting capability targets with many other Allies that have had long periods of underinvestment in defence. In light of declared US reprioritisations, larger and more demanding capability targets may be assigned to European Allies.

The Commission addressed the issue of Sweden's defence expenditure as defined by NATO in its 2023 interim report on the implementation of the 2020 Total Defence Resolution (Ds 2023:12). Since then, Sweden has added a number of expenditure items in its reporting of defence expenditure for core defence requirements to NATO, in addition to the appropriations allocated to defence authorities. Since 1 June 2026, all expenditure attributable to military support to Ukraine has also been reported as defence expenditure, which is considered to be in line with the practice of other countries. In addition, it has been decided to report expenditure for Sweden's Foreign Intelligence Service as defence expenditure, which means that defence expenditure, including the total additional expenditure reported to NATO, is significantly higher than the appropriations to defence authorities.

The enhancement of military defence capabilities needs to be adapted to the requirements arising from being a NATO Ally. Time must be a key factor in all political and administrative decisions regarding matters such as personnel, materiel and infrastructure.

As an Ally, Sweden undertakes, within the framework of collective defence and together with the other Allies, to maintain and develop its national capability to withstand armed attacks.

NATO's capability goals define the requirements placed on Sweden as part of the Alliance's collective defence. In line with the Allies' priorities, the war organisation must be able to conduct military operations in accordance with both national and allied requirements. The focus of the Defence Resolution is that Sweden should, as far as possible, meet the requirement set by NATO's capability targets and the commitments set out in NATO's joint operational planning, whilst ensuring that national defence needs are met. The Defence Commission sees a significant need for political prioritisation in the ongoing work.

The development of the war organisation is progressing gradually. The Defence Commission notes that military support to Ukraine has affected and will continue to affect the pace of rearmament of the war organisation. One and a half years into the Defence Resolution, however, there are shortcomings that have not been addressed, both regarding the targets set in the 2024 Defence Resolution and the requirements incumbent upon Sweden as an Ally, many of which were not known at the time of the Defence Resolution. As mentioned above, NATO membership also imposes requirements on the war organisation that have not yet been addressed, and which do not fit within the agreed financial frameworks. The discrepancies are both general in nature and domain-specific. The Swedish Armed Forces assesses that the resource requirements for a high level of fulfilment of NATO's capability targets clearly exceed the target level of 3.5 per cent of GDP, based on the principles for reporting defence expenditure to NATO agreed upon by the Defence Commission in 2023. Examples of major costs not covered by current planning frameworks include investments in air defence, requirements for materiel fulfilment across all branches of the armed forces and functions, and stockpiles of ammunition and supplies.

Combat units form the foundation and starting point for the organisation of the Swedish Armed Forces. The preparedness and capability of combat units in the broadest sense must therefore be at the core of the Swedish Armed Forces' activities in peacetime. This strengthens capability at all levels of preparedness. Combat units must be fully manned, properly equipped and well-trained to be able to carry out their tasks. The enhancement of military defence capabilities must be adapted to the requirements of NATO

membership. Time must be a key factor in all political and administrative decisions concerning, for example, personnel, materiel and infrastructure. Investments, particularly in materiel and infrastructure, are often associated with lead times spanning many years. Continued and enhanced cooperation with defence and security companies is of great importance for technological development, materiel procurement and, ultimately, the capability of combat units.

Measures that rapidly enhance the capability of combat units must continue to be prioritised. The ability to mobilise the entire war organisation in accordance with established requirements is of crucial importance to ensuring that combat units are credible and available for both national and allied operations.

Command

A functional and coherent command and control system is crucial for communication and command at all levels of conflict and for combat units being deployable both nationally and within NATO. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is a military doctrine based on the premise that there are five domains (land, sea, air, cyber and space) within which military operations are conducted. In order to participate in MDO, the Swedish Armed Forces believes that focus must shift to data-centric operational command and decision-making within the framework of military operations. This shift requires command and control support systems capable of generating and managing large amounts of data in real time, which in turn requires the introduction of technology available in the civilian sector, including cloud technology as a fundamental technological basis.

The Defence Commission is generally positive towards the development of this MDO capability but wishes, in this context, to point out that the introduction of certain new computerised systems in other parts of the public sector, and previously also in the defence sector, has proved to underperform and be subject to delays, whilst costs have significantly exceeded original estimates. Within a given economy, MDO capability must be balanced in terms of timing and substance against other pressing areas to strengthen military

capability, such as other capabilities, the procurement of ammunition, infrastructure, and protection and weapons systems.

The Defence Commission attaches great importance to taking into account the issues of control and dependence on individual states and technology companies when introducing cloud technology. As cloud technology is crucial for, among other things, data processing and as a decision-support tool in the command and control domain, adjustments should be made to meet the requirements that military operations place on integrity, independence and control.

Logistics

The Swedish Armed Forces' logistics are currently in a build-up phase and need to be strengthened in the coming years. This applies to both the joint operational units at the operational level and to the maintenance services (basic services) within the Army, Navy and Air Force. According to the 2024 Defence Resolution, there is a need in all areas to provide personnel, equipment and infrastructure, as well as to strengthen combat unit production.

Logistic is a prerequisite for Sweden to be able to receive and transit allied units on Swedish territory. Sweden's geographical location makes this aspect particularly important. The Defence Commission wishes to emphasise that the preparations for host nation support, such as the pre-positioning of equipment and supplies, are usually bilateral commitments between Allies and not formally a matter handled by NATO as an organisation. A functioning logistics and maintenance service is a prerequisite for host nation support, and this also includes command and control arrangements. Creating the necessary conditions to meet such needs in cooperation with, for example, Norway and Finland is of great importance.

It is important that the Swedish Armed Forces communicate the need for support to civil defence actors in order to enable Swedish and allied military operations on Swedish territory, both in peacetime and in the event of heightened alert and, ultimately, war. It is also essential that civil defence is strengthened and trained to be

able to contribute to host nation support in accordance with NATO's requirements for enabling large-scale military operations.

The Army

Following mobilisation, the Army must be able to counter armed attacks both on and outside Swedish territory. Field units must be able to fight in larger formations such as divisions and corps. In peacetime, the Army contributes units to NATO operations and activities for deterrence and defence. The Army's war organisation is undergoing a phased build-up of the four new brigades and divisional units that have been decided upon. These units will be completed in due course.

The Defence Commission emphasises the need to build new capabilities and expertise in the area of drones and anti-drone measures across the board within the war organisation. Ongoing and planned procurements of supplies, including ammunition, will to some extent increase the Army's endurance in wartime. Intelligence and information-sharing are also being strengthened, including through the development of our own drone capability. Increased digitalisation creates opportunities to handle larger volumes of information, but also to reduce the time from the detection of hostile targets to our own response.

For the Army, it is particularly clear that NATO's capability goals place higher demands on materiel supply, qualitative capability and endurance than current planning and financial frameworks allow.

The Navy

The Navy is undergoing a transition characterised by amended tasks as a result of NATO membership, entailing, among other things, an expanded capability of extended operations at sea. With the future procurement of new frigates, including advanced air defence capabilities, the Navy will be equipped with significantly larger vessels and have capability that Sweden has never before possessed.

As a result of NATO membership the Navy's tasks have changed – shifting from a defensive naval strategy focused on contesting an

adversary's control to one that is more proactive and offensive, with the aim of establishing control and securing flows from the North Sea to the west coast ports and onward through the Baltic Sea into its own and allied ports. There is also a need to build new capabilities and expertise in the area of drones and anti-drone measure, as well as air defence.

The Air Force

The Air Force must have sufficient endurance to be able to carry our tasks in accordance with operational planning, both nationally and within the framework of NATO. The Air Force must also be able to contribute units to NATO operations and activities for deterrence and defence in peacetime. The current security situation underscores the Air Force's role in upholding Swedish sovereignty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, by monitoring, protecting and defending Swedish airspace. Membership of NATO also entails increased deployments of Swedish air units for NATO operations and for the surveillance and protection of allied airspace.

The Air Force is at the start of a period of extensive replacement of materiel systems. This involves the replacement of the sensor chain, the replacement of transport aircraft, the reequipping of three fighter squadrons with the JAS39E, the integration of new weapon systems for long-range strike capability, and the introduction of new command and control and radar reconnaissance aircraft. Furthermore, the space sector is being developed, including the procurement of satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Personnel supply

A coherent and effective personnel supply system is fundamental to creating and maintaining operational combat units, i.e. to the Armed Forces' ability to operate in times of peace, crisis and war. The Defence Commission notes that conscription will continue to form the basis of the Armed Forces' personnel supply and contributes to public support. Swedish units comprising conscripts will form part of NATO's collective defence in accordance with Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Armed Forces' personnel supply is based on total defence service, including conscription, as well as employment and contracts. Conscripts fill a significant share of posts in the Armed Forces' operational units. In addition, there are several different categories of professional officers, volunteers serving on contract in various parts of the Armed Forces, and civilian employees. The Armed Forces depends on all these personnel categories in order to function. The voluntary defence organisations provide various specialist skills in military and civil defence and are thus important reinforcement resources. The Home Guard, with its local links and volunteer base, also ensures high availability and contributes to strong public support.

NATO membership has meant that personnel supply in certain areas needs to be adapted and adjusted to be fit for purpose. The work of implementing combat unit categorisation and organising personnel within this structure is a high priority. NATO membership means that the number of Armed Forces personnel serving abroad, for example in NATO headquarters and in NATO operations, is increasing. The Defence Commission considers it important that the Armed Forces have the necessary prerequisites and good working conditions to enable effective staffing of these types of posts.

Combat units must be fully manned, properly equipped and well-trained to be able to carry out their tasks. The increased capability of the military defence needs to be adapted to the requirements that come with being a NATO Ally. The Defence Commission emphasises the importance of a coherent personnel supply system for total defence that can ensure that, for example, contract personnel from voluntary defence organisations, Home Guard soldiers, conscripts, civil defence conscripts, part-time non-commissioned officers, soldiers and sailors, as well as reserve officers, can be released from their regular jobs and made available to the relevant organisation within total defence when a decision has been made to raise the level of readiness.

6. Impediments to military growth

Procurement and supply of defence material

The ability to develop, manufacture, maintain and adapt defence materiel in large volumes, and using new technology, both prior to and during an ongoing war, is fundamental to the capability of the Armed Forces. The Defence Commission therefore highlights a number of proposals aimed at removing obstacles to growth in the area of materiel supply. The Commission has identified situations in which an increase in production capacity and the need for security of supply cannot be met by the market. Among other things the Commission therefore considers that a strategic instrument could be an adapted risk-sharing arrangement between the state and the defence industry.

In certain cases, long-term government contracts could create incentives for relevant companies to invest in the expansion of their production capacity. The Commission considers that the need for long-term government contracts in certain areas can be met through authorisation by the Riksdag to extend the long-term financial commitments in the budget bill. The Defence Commission suggests that the 30-year perspective of the current budget legislation for the defence area is still relevant and thus finds that consideration should be given to extending the empowerment by the Riksdag to enter into long term financial commitments for the procurement of defence materiel where necessary in the budget bills for a period until 2050, for example.

In addition, the Defence Commission considers that there are grounds for reviewing the possibilities of financing through guarantees or by providing loans from the Swedish National Debt Office to certain businesses in the defence and security sector whose production is considered to be of particular importance for the sustainable supply of materiel in war time. In relation to the defence industry, the Defence Commission also notes that significant deviations from contractually agreed deliveries cannot be considered acceptable and that there may be grounds to review whether more extensive breaches of contract should have negative consequences.

The Defence Commission notes that there are major demands on the development and upgrading of high-tech expendable materiel

such as drones. Such materiel becomes quickly outdated, for which reason there is little reason to maintain stockpiles of it. Its procurement can be equated to the purchase of services, which is a model that differs from traditional materiel procurement. The Commission considers that this necessitate adjustments to the Government's model of governance and follow-up for materiel supply, as well as its reporting of results to the Riksdag. Therefore, the Defence Commission also considers it necessary for the Government to examine how the increasing share of services affects governance and follow-up in the area of materiel supply and to make necessary adjustments.

In order to enable quick decisions on materiel procurement for the Swedish Armed Forces, the Government has introduced an appropriation for the period 2026–2028 determined to facilitate defence procurement on short notice, so called 'opportune purchases'. The Defence Commission proposes that the period for 'opportune purchases' should be extended until 2030.

Priority should be given to purchases that could quickly provide increased resilience and meet strategic operational requirements that are in line with NATO capability targets. The Commission also considers that the Government's approval of opportune purchases should only be required for investments entailing financial commitments that exceed the general applicable level for procurement (i.e. SEK 700 000 000) and that the reporting of results should be improved.

Infrastructure

In the following, the Defence Commission presents its proposals aimed at removing obstacles to the rapid building and use of infrastructure required for Sweden's total defence. The Defence Commission's proposals primarily concern the development of infrastructure for military defence, where continued growth continues to face significant risks and problems. Access to infrastructure such as military ports, airports, exercise and training areas, etc. with appropriate permits in accordance with the Swedish Environmental Code is a fundamental prerequisite for military

defence in general, and for with the ability of Allies to operate on Swedish territory.

The four new regiments that are being added to the military defence are currently at different stages of completion. The Defence Commission finds that measures must be taken to implement the Riksdag's decision regarding infrastructure. The fact that the Dalarna Regiment (I 13) in Falun is expected to reach full capacity in the period after 2035, rather than during the period 2026-2030, which is more than 15 years after the decision by the Riksdag, is unacceptable. This also shows that the problems in the area of infrastructure are extensive. The Defence Commission considers that measures must be taken to implement the Riksdag's decision before 2035.

With the aim of ensuring infrastructure with the appropriate permit conditions in accordance with the Swedish Environmental Code, the Defence Commission notes that it may be reasonable to consider the possibility of granting exemptions from certain procedural rules for parts of total defence. The EU Directives implemented in Swedish legislation thus far have been assessed in a very different international situation from today's. The changed international situation may require both a shift in Sweden's approach in this regard, and a review of areas where Sweden has not utilised possibilities for exemptions for defence.

With regard to the impact various government agencies have on rearmament and total defence, the Commission proposes that the Government task relevant government agencies with analysing impact of their activities on total defence. This type of assessment of how their activities, guidelines, etc. may affect the efforts to strengthen Sweden's total defence could give a better picture of whether further measures are needed to ensure that we are in line with the Defence Resolution. One such example could be the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, which, through its drafting of guidelines and similar documents concerning nature reserves, can influence decisions on detailed regulations for nature reserves for all of municipalities and county administrative boards in Sweden. At times detailed regulations are an impediment to military exercises. The Defence Commission has stressed that the environment needs to be protected in an appropriate manner, whilst overly detailed restrictions should not be an absolute impediment to

the use of new military systems. In this way, the Commission aims to achieve a higher degree of coexistence.

As regards the Swedish Fortifications Agency, the Commission considers that the Riksdag's objective – that the Agency has to act as a model for sustainably designed living environments and contribute to the national objective for architecture and design – should be adapted to the demands on infrastructure development within military defence arising from the international situation. The requirements of total defence, particularly the military requirements, should more clearly permeate the Swedish Fortifications Agency's role and activities. In the expansion of infrastructure, the Commission further emphasises the importance of planning, procurement and groundwork being carried out in parallel to a greater extent rather than successively. In summary, the Swedish Fortifications Agency's role within total defence would be further strengthened, and the Agency should therefore be transferred to expenditure area 6 under the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, the Commission stresses the importance of considering whether the current return-on-equity requirement for the Swedish Fortifications Agency should be removed. This has, to some extent, prevented the Agency from contributing to the rapid expansion of military infrastructure, and the same applies for the requirements on the Agency to enhance the value of state-owned properties and real estate in the defence area. The Commission also considers that a review should be carried out to re-examine the Agency's funding so as to ensure that it contributes to a rapid rearmament process and effective growth.

The Defence Commission considers that it would be desirable for total defence interests to be defined as an objective in urban and regional planning. If total defence interests are taken into account at an early stage of the planning process, whenever there are sufficient grounds for this, costly refurbishments could be avoided. For example, increased physical protection of government agency buildings could be ensured. Moreover, costly refurbishments of hospitals, police stations, etc. could also be avoided. In the area of civil defence, early measures taken to ensure robust and resilient facilities and infrastructure should contribute to the rapid and effective development of Sweden's total defence.

Protective security

In November 2025, the Government adopted terms of reference for an inquiry into a new system for personnel security (Dir 2025:105). The Defence Commission considers it appropriate for an inquiry to analyse whether the procedure for register checks during security vetting needs to be amended and whether a clearance system should be introduced whereby the individual is cleared, rather than the current system where security vetting is linked to the individual's current duties. The Defence Commission attaches great importance to the ongoing review of the new personnel security regime also including impact assessments of the proposals regarding lead times and the extent of the administrative burdens that will follow for both government agencies and defence and security companies, with the aim of achieving more adequate security protection that can better support the continued development of Sweden's total defence.

The Defence Commission notes that that work to develop civil defence capabilities is even broader in scope and encompasses a wide range of measures, such as the procurement of goods, services and premises, the conclusion of contingency agreements, planning for personnel movement and personnel training. Cooperation between stakeholders is a prerequisite for capability development at all levels to be realised. Many civilian stakeholders carry out security-sensitive activities and are therefore obliged to apply protective security legislation, for example by entering into protective security agreements with suppliers and conducting security vetting of individuals who are to participate in security-sensitive activities. Applying and complying with protective security legislation is a necessary but extensive and time-consuming task, even for actors in civil defence. This currently poses a major challenge to the rapid reconstruction of a robust total defence.

The Defence Commission considers it necessary to take measures to reduce the number of protective security agreements and to establish a more operationally oriented and effective way of ensuring robust protective security in Sweden. The Defence Commission assesses that protective security needs to be adapted to operational needs and that there are grounds for further reviewing the legislation in this area.