Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Maria Malmer Stenergard during her visit to the Swedish Defence University

Excellencies, colleagues, friends of the Arctic,

For many years, the Arctic region was seen as a peaceful zone of cooperation.

That era ended with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

The main Arctic issues before then – climate change, the growing interest in the region from non-Arctic states and the need to invest in infrastructure – still matter. 

But security policy now plays a greater role in Arctic affairs than it did before 2022. That is the main reason why the Swedish Government will present a new, updated Arctic strategy next spring.

I won’t provide you all the details of the strategy, since it’s still a work in progress. 

However, I will present the main elements that we are looking into and the factors that make an update of Sweden’s Arctic Strategy necessary. 

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First – as the third Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs in a row from Skåne in the south of Sweden – I want to stress that Sweden is an Arctic nation.

In my role, it has become clear to me that Sweden’s North is more strategically relevant to our national and collective defence than how it sometimes appears in public debate. 

In the words of my predecessor Tobias Billström: “Gotland has held a more prominent place in the discussion than Norrbotten.” 

This needs to change, because as decisionmakers and policymakers we must be able to think and act in several directions at once.

Our two northernmost counties – Västerbotten and Norrbotten – represent one-third of Sweden’s territory, and just over half a million Swedes call this part of the country home. This area is rich in culture, natural beauty and resources. 

This region is also vital to the security of Sweden and of our NATO Allies, since the main Russian avenues of attack towards the North Atlantic and North America begin in Northern Europe. 

Therefore, protecting the Arctic is crucial to our national and to our collective security. For Sweden, the Arctic is an area where national and international interests intersect. 

In other words: we have skin in the game, and compelling reasons to engage even more in Arctic affairs. 

Today, I want to outline four major factors that are driving change in the Arctic, and which force Sweden and other likeminded states in the region to respond: security, climate change, economic opportunities and increased international interest. 

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Let me start with security.

In 2020, the former Swedish Government presented an Arctic Strategy that already reflects a time gone by.

The strategy describes how cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council has worked well, and it only mentions NATO once. 

Less than two years after the strategy was published, Russia launched its full-scale invasion against Ukraine.

Since then, this Swedish Government has stated that we and our Allies have a duty to support Ukraine and to resist Russia’s expansion of power.

Russian expansionism can be seen not just in Ukraine but in the Arctic as well, where Russian military activities pose potential threats to the other Arctic states.

Russia’s Northern Fleet, its second-strike capability on the Kola Peninsula and the strategic importance of Arctic waters and the North Atlantic make this a key region for NATO.

Sweden plays a central role in this context, not least because of our unique geographical position – joining the Arctic with the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, connecting to the North Atlantic. 

That is why the Arctic is an essential element of Sweden’s broader foreign and security policy agenda. It is also why Sweden will put security at the heart of our new, updated Arctic strategy. 

Sweden fully embraces the opportunities that our geography provides us to also strengthen the collective defence of our neighbours. This is good for us, good for our neighbours and good for NATO.

Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession has strengthened the position and capabilities of the Alliance in the High North. It has finally made it possible for NATO to plan military operations in Northern Europe more effectively.

We are one of only a few NATO countries with troops who are trained for combat in Arctic and sub-Arctic conditions, and we are shouldering our regional responsibilities as a framework nation for NATO’s Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Finland. The FLF will significantly strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in the High North. 

We are also leveraging our strategic resources, industry, infrastructure and geostrategic position in the space domain. 

The Esrange Space Center provides a strategic asset for NATO and the EU in this regard. Located north of the Arctic Circle, it gives Sweden and its Allies independent and resilient access to space.

For example, if a satellite belonging to an Ally is attacked, the opportunities are now being strengthened at Esrange to launch a replacement within 24 hours. 

In this way, we and our Allies can avoid the disappearance of key communications and signals intelligence capabilities for extended periods of time. 

Moreover, Sweden brings another strategic asset to the table: icebreaker vessels and the unique know-how that comes with operating them. 

With Polar icebreaker Oden, Sweden operates one of the world’s most powerful non-nuclear icebreakers and platforms for advanced Polar research. 

Russia has an icebreaker fleet of close to 60 ships, while all NATO Allies combined have fewer than 50. New icebreakers are being procured and built, including in Finland. 

For Sweden, securing independent access to the High Arctic by sea is a key strategic interest. In its budget proposal for 2026, the Government confirms that the issue of a new Polar research vessel after Oden is being examined. From a total defence perspective, icebreaking vessels are an essential asset. 

To fully grasp the risks and opportunities in a changing Arctic environment, academic research and indigenous knowledge is key. 

Sweden has a rich history of Polar research and remains a leading actor in the field. 

These academic achievements are important both for making scientific advances, and to reinforce Sweden’s position as an Arctic state and to protect our national security interests.

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The second main factor driving change in the Arctic is climate change. 

It is a fact that the Arctic is warming much faster than the rest of the Earth. Climate change, biodiversity loss and increased pollution seriously affect local communities in the Arctic – and have global implications. 

At the same time, retreating ice also offers opportunities for new trade routes, increased connectivity and new forms of economic activity. 

Valuable natural resources such as critical raw materials become more easily accessible. 

If these resources can be explored and managed sustainably and in compliance with international law, they can bring significant prosperity. 

We must also pay close attention to China’s long-term ambitions in the Arctic, which are partly driven by these new opportunities.

A few months ago, the first commercial container ship from China through the Northern Sea Route made port in Europe. China is quickly expanding its ice breaker fleet and has been a permanent observer to the Arctic Council since 2013. 

Russia’s dependence on China for its continued warfare in Ukraine creates an asymmetric relationship that China can use to further its presence in the Arctic. 

China’s scientific activities are likely dual-use, and an Arctic presence can help secure its security interests. 

As an Arctic state, Sweden expects all actors – Arctic and non-Arctic alike – to respect and uphold international law, and to seek peaceful means of interacting in the Arctic. 

For us, respect for the Law of the Sea – including freedom of navigation – is a core security interest. It is also key to foreign trade, which largely takes place by sea. 

Sometimes, we encounter both ignorance and misconceptions about the legal and territorial circumstances in the Arctic. 

Some refer to the Arctic as a common good or suggest the internationalisation of the Arctic. 

Some carelessly refer to the Arctic as a lawless place. 

Such misconceptions are not helpful. In times of increasing geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, we stress the importance of international law, governance and respect for indigenous peoples. 

Repeated statements by President Trump about Greenland create additional uncertainty.

And on that issue, let me reiterate: Only Denmark and Greenland decide on issues concerning Denmark and Greenland, and Sweden obviously stands behind our neighbouring country on these issues. 

For the Swedish Government, asserting Sweden’s legitimate role and interests in Arctic Affairs is crucial. In this endeavour, we unite with our fellow Nordic States. 

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To achieve our objectives in the Arctic, we must of course work together with our neighbours, Allies and partners. 

Currently, some of our key partners are also bringing their Arctic strategies up to date with changing security conditions. 

My Finnish colleague Elina Valtonen recently presented a new Arctic Foreign and Security Policy. 

In August, Norway launched its High North Policy for a New Era.

Last autumn, Canada presented its new Arctic Foreign Policy.

I have also noted that Italy is increasing its Arctic engagement, and I welcome its participation in FLF Finland.  

The similarities are striking in how these partners – and we – assess the current set of challenges and how we strategically respond. I see both compelling reasons and good opportunities to deepen cooperation with likeminded countries. 

Next year, the European Commission is also expected to present a new communication on the Arctic. 

I welcome that the EU updates its policy and seeks to strengthen its cooperation in Arctic nations and regions, in close dialogue with the three Arctic EU Member States. 

It is in Sweden’s interest that the EU and its Member States fully grasp the specifics of the Arctic, and that they want to engage and take relevant action. 

For instance, EU financial support to our Northern, sparsely populated areas and in the field of research is hugely important. The EU is also essential in areas such as critical infrastructure and digital connectivity. 

One example is the Polar Connect initiative, which aims to link the Nordic and Indo-Pacific regions via a fiberoptic submarine cable through the Arctic. 

This would create an alternative route that reduces vulnerabilities in digital infrastructure, and enables secure, fast global communications.

Another example of strategic cooperation is the Swedish-Norwegian space cooperation. Our two Prime Ministers have stated publicly our common goal of the North Calotte as a leading and competitive European space region. This will benefit both Europe and NATO. 

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New security challenges, climate change and increasing international interest in the Arctic underline the urgency of updating Sweden’s Arctic Strategy. 

Work on the strategy is currently underway at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other key ministries, with the aim of launching it by late spring 2026. 

The work will include listening to relevant actors outside of Government, such as academia and think-tanks, regional and local bodies, business representatives, civil society and indigenous organisations, Arctic, non-Arctic states and NATO allies. 

Through these conversations and the implementation of the strategy, I hope that general awareness, academic research and policy development on foreign and security policy aspects of the Arctic will increase. This will have many benefits, including strengthening Sweden’s agency in the Arctic.

Our Ambassador for Arctic Affairs Helen Eduards is here today and is ready to answer questions you may have about work on the new Arctic Strategy. 

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In May 2027, Sweden will assume the Chairship of the Arctic Council for a two-year period. This is an important task. 

Like Norway and Denmark before us, we will use our term to promote the crucial role and achievements of the Arctic Council. 

Russia’s war of aggression Ukraine has affected the work of the Council – it is not business-as-usual. 

But the fact remains that the Arctic Council is a unique forum to jointly address common concerns in the Arctic, bringing together Member States, indigenous representatives, scientists, observer states and civil society organisations.

The Swedish Chairship will be a joint effort, involving a range of actors in Sweden. 

Since Mikael Frisell, Director General of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, will soon take the floor, I would like to pay tribute to the contribution the Agency makes to the Arctic Council working group on emergency prevention, preparedness and response. 

Many Swedish government agencies and scientists work hard to ensure that the Arctic Council continues to develop and to deliver. In this way, we collectively help shape the future of the Arctic.  

Thank you for inviting me – I look forward to our discussions.