Defence Resolution 2025-2030

Overview of priorities for the military defence

The military defence is receiving a substantial allocation of more than SEK 170 billion through 2030 to increase military capabilities for deterrence and defence. The war organisation must be reinforced with additional personnel, material and units with joint exercise experience. Accelerating the pace of military unit production must be prioritised with the aim of increasing the capability to defend Sweden and its Allies against armed attacks. A major share of this allocation will go towards completing and reinforcing the war organisation as outlined in the 2020 Defence Resolution. The allocation will also go towards additional anti-aircraft systems, more ammunition, and supplies. Efforts to clear obstacles to growth continue within the military authorities. The pace of the military defence’s growth must also increase.

• More about the economic direction for the military defence in Section 12.1 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Growth-based governance

The governance of the military defence needs to be adapted to enable the growth and capability enhancement proposed in the Total Defence Bill. This adaptation will be based on delegated decision-making, strengthening the Government’s monitoring and improving conditions for long-term planning. If regulatory frameworks and processes prevent the defence’s growth, they should be identified and, as far as possible, made more effective.

• More about governance of the military defence in Section 12.4 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Swedish Armed Forces war time organisation

Fighting units are the basis of Sweden’s contribution to NATO deterrence and collective defence. Already apportioned NATO Capability Targets and those expected in 2025 are an important starting point for shaping the Swedish war time organisation. The war time organisation needs to be established, organised, and staffed as soon as possible to achieve a deterrent effect and carry out the Swedish Armed Forces’ primary task.

• More about measures within the Swedish Armed Forces war time organisation in section 6.5 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Enhanced division capability and territorial units

After mobilising, the Army must be able to meet an armed attack on Swedish territory and beyond. Units’ division capability (with corresponding divisional units) must be developed to be able to fight in larger formations, in accordance with the operational planning within NATO. To be able to coordinate fighting and concentrate units, military and supporting units need to be supplied at division level. In addition to the already initiated command capability, this involves the continued organisation of two artillery battalions and an additional rocket artillery unit, an electronic warfare battalion, an intelligence battalion, an engineer battalion, an anti-aircraft battalion, a maintenance battalion, and an armoured transport battalion.

For materiel requirements, the focus is on supplying at division level and providing additional materiel to the brigades and increasing materiel availability. Additional infantry fighting vehicles (CV 90) will be procured, and renovation of existing infantry fighting vehicles and tanks will continue. Artillery, loitering munition systems (armed drones), reconnaissance drones, anti-aircraft artillery and long-range fighting capability in the form of rocket artillery will also be procured. Procurement of supplies, including ammunition, will also take place with the aim of increasing stockpiles.

• More about measures within the Army in Section 6.5.1 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Enhanced naval sustainability

Naval logistics capability will be strengthened by establishing naval bases in the three garrison towns of Haninge, Gothenburg and Karlskrona. The naval bases will develop capabilities that include providing logistical support to Allied units within the maritime domain and support the garrisons’ mobilisation and supply capabilities during heightened alert. Development of the two newly established naval base battalions in Haninge and Karlskrona will continue.

Naval sustainability will be enhanced through measures such as increasing stockpiles of ammunition, both naval-specific and other qualified ammunition, with the aim of fulfilling NATO requirements to a greater extent.

• More about measures within the Navy in Section 6.5.2 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Air forces and dependence on space services

The Air Force is responsible for controlling the airspace together with the air defence units and Allies at an early stage of conflict. The ability to concentrate forces against an aggressor at an early stage as air defence forces disperse simultaneously is of critical importance. Serial deliveries of JAS Gripen 39E fighter aircraft will take place during the period and become operational during the period. Upgrades with new capabilities of the JAS Gripen 39 C/D will be carried out. This includes introducing long-range ground attack capability to the fighter squadrons in the period 2025–2030.

Additional interceptor missiles, medium-range precision weapons, cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles for the JAS Gripen 39 will be procured. Additional Black Hawk utility helicopters and additional SK 50 Grob basic trainer aircraft will also be procured. Three S 106 GlobalEye aircraft will also be procured. Dependence on space services is increasing and Sweden needs to develop crisis and war preparedness that involves the space domain. In the period 2025–2030, procurement of military satellites and the Swedish Armed Forces’ capability to launch them will begin.

• More about measures within the Air Force and space domain in section 6.5.3 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Increased demand for special forces units

The current geopolitical situation in combination with Sweden’s NATO membership has increased the demand for special forces units. Special forces units need to be dimensioned to carry out special operations both independently and together with other combat forces and authorities. This must be possible at national and international level, across the entire conflict scale and within the framework of NATO deterrence and defence measures. The capability of discovering, combating and actively preventing an aggressor’s measures for establishment in, influence on and escalation against Sweden and Swedish interests domestically and internationally must continue to develop.

• More about measures within special forces units in Section 6.5.4 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Digital capability in the command function

A functioning, cohesive and robust command is one of the prerequisites for the ability to engage in combat. The Swedish Armed Forces’ efforts to enhance command capability should therefore be intensified. Interoperability with NATO should continue to develop with the aim of being able to carry out and coordinate operations with Allies. Command capability at operational level will be reinforced with operational joint battalions. Command capability at tactical level will be reinforced with command units for the Army Staff, divisions and military regions. Electronic warfare capabilities within the Army will also be enhanced.

• More about measures within the command function in Section 6.5.5 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Logistics function essential for combat sustainability

The logistics function will continue to be reinforced and the Swedish Armed Forces logistics concept will be developed and implemented to enable military operations independently and together with Allies. Well-functioning logistics requires a clear chain of command with corresponding responsibilities.

The number of maintenance and medical units will increase with the aim of shoring up logistics at strategic, operational and tactical level. This means that military unit production needs to be able to increase and that military, air and naval bases need to be developed within the framework of logistics. The Swedish Armed Forces needs to clarify responsibility for military unit production within logistics – primarily the role of branches of the armed services – with the aim of making military unit production more effective.

• More about measures within the logistics function in Section 6.5.6 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

New materiel for the Home Guard

Home Guard units have the capability to quickly support mobilisation and protect and guard military objects, base areas and essential public services. The Home Guard’s local connection and voluntary basis generate high availability and contribute to strong popular support. The goal should be for the Home Guard to comprise 26 000 personnel by 2030. New materiel should be allocated to the Home Guard, including vehicles, boats, sensors, thermal and night vision devices and tactical radios. This will entail an upgrade of materiel for the Home Guard units.

• More about measures within the Home Guard in section 6.5.7 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

More conscripts and expanded officer training

Reinforcement of the war organisation entails an increased need for personnel. According to the Swedish Armed Forces, the total number of positions in the war time organisation is expected to reach approximately 130 000 personnel plus reserves when the organisation has been fully staffed by 2035.

The annual basic training volume will increase gradually to at least 10 000 conscripts by 2030 and then reach approximately 12 000 conscripts during the period 2032–2035. To achieve this, the capacity of the Total Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency to call up and enrol personnel in national military services needs to be increased by establishing a fourth testing facility. Investments are being made to expand officer training. Moreover, plans have been made to increase the number of seats in specialist officer training and reserve officer training.

• More about measures within personnel supply in Section 6.6 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Infrastructure that meets military needs

Access to infrastructure such as naval ports, air wings, military air bases, firing ranges and training grounds with appropriate conditions are fundamental prerequisites for military defence activities and Allies’ ability to operate on Swedish territory. Geopolitical developments and the associated growth within the military defence affect both short-term and long-term needs for infrastructure. To manage this growth, the relevant authorities need to adopt new approaches and processes. The military needs will necessitate investments in the Swedish transport infrastructure.

The Government intends to review laws, ordinances and approaches to identify the changes that may be necessary to clear obstacles to building up the total defence and realising the defence policy direction adopted through broad political consensus. Moreover, additional coordination is needed between the Swedish Armed Forces materiel and infrastructure processes and personnel supply in order to be able to identify needs and requirements for materiel-related measures at an earlier stage.

• More about measures within infrastructure supply in Section 6.8 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Enhanced Defence Intelligence

Defence intelligence capability and the military security service should be enhanced and developed. National and international cooperation should be intensified. The capability to carry out joint activities should be intensified especially with the civilian Swedish Security Service and the Swedish Police. Digitalisation is essential to intelligence and security services, the Swedish Armed Forces’ operational capability and the Total Defence’s overall capability. Relevant authorities’ digital capability needs to be developed and Sweden needs to make major investments to increase the Total Defence’s robustness, capability and resilience. In the long term, Defence intelligence agencies must develop their information-gathering and surveillance capabilities in the space domain.

• More about measures within foreign intelligence capability and military security service in Section 9.1 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Increased resources to volunteer defence organisations

Volunteer defence organisations are important for the overall capability within the total defence and for popular support. They thus make a strong contribution to Sweden’s will to defend itself. They also contribute to the staffing of Sweden’s total defence. Such organisations must receive sufficient funding to meet the increasing needs within the total defence and to establish long-term operational conditions for their own development. The Government has therefore proposed allocating funds to the voluntary defence organisations in the Budget Bill for 2025.

• More about measures within voluntary organisations in Section 10 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Opportunities and threats associated with technological development

Swedish defence innovation capability is a strategic advantage in peace, crisis and war. The Government is now mobilising resources to promote technological development, defence research and defence innovation. The appropriation (1:4) totals almost SEK 1.1 billion this year and will increase in the future. By 2027, the appropriation will have increased by more than 50 per cent to just over SEK 1.6 billion.

• More about measures within research and development in Section 11 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)
• Defence Innovation

Sweden as an Ally

As an Ally, Sweden will contribute to improving NATO’s collective defence capability. This requires strong national military capability that can contribute to both national and collective defence. Sweden will, as far as possible, fulfil NATO Capability Targets and the undertakings set out by NATO’s joint operation planning while at the same time ensuring that national defence needs are met.

Military operations require functioning logistics that enable sustainable supply, protection, mobility and command of military units. This includes military capabilities and civil support to military operations. The ability to provide host nation support is part of this. For this reason, we need to strengthen the capability to support Allied operations on or from Swedish territory and exercise our host nation support capability.

• More about Sweden as an Ally and consequences for the military defence in Section 6.3 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Sweden’s military support to Ukraine

Support to Ukraine is a core element of Sweden’s security and defence policy. Sweden will support Ukraine’s fight for as long as necessary. To strengthen and ensure the sustainability of Sweden’s support to Ukraine, the Government has created a three-year economic framework for military support to Ukraine totalling SEK 75 billion for 2024–2026.

This support to Ukraine affects the war organisation’s development. To reduce the impact, the Government will move from donation to production in its support to Ukraine. Lessons from the war in Ukraine will be analysed and utilised in the development of the Swedish defence and will be operational, tactical and technical in nature.

• More about Swedish military support to Ukraine and lessons from the war in Ukraine in Section 6.4 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)
• Military support to Ukraine

Economic direction for the civil defence

The Government’s main civil defence priorities for the upcoming period are to continue to enhance capacity and to accelerate the pace of development. The introduction of an economic planning framework signals a paradigm shift that, in short, will entail allocations to the civil defence totalling SEK 37.5 billion for 2025–2030.

• More about Economic direction for the civil defence in Section 12.2 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Governance with a holistic approach

The Government considers that the governance and monitoring of the civil defence should be strengthened with a particular emphasis on transparency and suitability. Based on the economic planning framework for the civil defence, the Government intends to review existing structures and processes. The basic premise for this work should be that governance and monitoring take place based on specified objectives and with a holistic approach that starts with the core background material and assessments of developments in this area. This is part of the Government’s efforts to raise the ambition level for the civil defence, which has become necessary due to the serious international situation.

• More about governance of the civil defence in Section 12.5 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Enhanced roles and mandate for command

A heightened alert situation places great demands on the command and coordination of the civil defence. Effective and clear command structures and responsibilities are a prerequisite for coordination both within the civil defence and between the military and civil defence, and are also essential for the total defence to be able to fulfil its tasks.

The command of the civil defence during heightened alert and ultimately war should consist of actors with responsibility for geographic areas – from the Government (national level) via county administrative boards responsible for the civil defence regions (higher regional level) to the county administrative boards (lower regional level) and the municipalities (local level). During heightened alert, it is necessary that decisions can be made independently at various levels to achieve the highest possible defence effect. This requires a clear allocation of responsibilities and mandates at the relevant levels. County administrative boards with responsibility for the civil defence regions and government agencies with responsibility for sectors need clearer roles and stronger mandates.

• More about Command structure and organisation of the civil defence in Section 7.2.1 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Enhanced capacity to support the military defence

The civil defence – at national, higher regional, regional and local level, and within the business sector – needs to intensify and actualise the efforts to enhance its capacity to support the military defence. The Swedish Armed Forces needs to continue to advance its work to conclusively define its and the Alliance’s support needs and communicate this to relevant government agencies. Cohesive national planning for and implementation of host nation support are necessary for effective civil support of military operations. Moreover, cohesive national planning and implementation for reception of humanitarian and other civil support are needed.

• More about the civil defence’s capacity to support the military defence in Section 7.2.4 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Ensure organisations continue to maintain functionality during war

Preparations, planning and exercises for the transition from peacetime organisation to war organisation are essential for ensuring the functionality of the total defence. The work of central government agencies, municipalities and regions to ensure that an organisation is in place that can maintain necessary activities during heightened alert and ultimately war needs to continue to advance. The Government is therefore stressing the importance of those actors analysing their activities to identify the priority activities that must be maintained during heightened alert. Then those actors must ensure that an organisation is in place that can maintain the identified activities. Following an analysis, central government agencies, municipalities and regions should identify and take any measures that are necessary to be able to maintain priority activities during heightened alert and ultimately war. Those actors need to be able to maintain these activities and ensure that an organisation is in place that is staffed and trained, and has conducted exercises to be able to manage the priority tasks.

• More about ensuring an organisation is in place that can maintain necessary activities during heightened alert and ultimately war in Section 7.2.3 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Continued development of rescue services and protection of the civilian population

Protecting the civilian population during an armed attack is a fundamental task for the civil defence and contributes to maintaining the population’s will to defend itself and its resilience. Strengthening capacity within rescue services and taking measures to protect the civilian population are particularly urgent. The measures that have the greatest capacity-increasing impact in the short term should be prioritised. Initiatives already under way with the aim of strengthening capacity within these areas need to continue and be enhanced further.

The Government considers it necessary to increase capacity within municipal rescue services through training and investments in additional human and material resources. For example, a fundamental capacity to manage tasks such as identifying, marking out and clearing dangerous areas, and the capacity to signal, clean up and take other protective measures against nuclear or chemical weapons are needed. To enhance protection of the civilian population during an armed attack, the Government’s assessment is that protective measures should be viewed as a cohesive whole comprising a warning system, protective shelters and spaces, evacuation and quartering. Existing protective shelters should be utilised, and it is therefore necessary to accelerate the pace of inventory and inspection.

• More about rescue services and protection of the civilian population in Section 7.3.10 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Capacity-building within health and medical care

Functioning health and medical care and social services during peacetime are a prerequisite for functioning health and medical care and social services during war. To be able to deal with mass casualties during war, the Government sees a need for capacity-building and strengthening of the care capacity within the health and medical care system. The Government also considers that work to increase accessibility and care capacity and strengthen skills supply within health and medical care should continue on its present trajectory.

Furthermore, the Government considers that the ongoing work to strengthen supply preparedness at various levels within the health and medical care system should continue. The aim is to create a robust system that also ensures access to medical care products during peacetime crisis situations, heightened alert and ultimately war through measures such as increased stockpiling by regions and municipalities. A build-up of national stockpiles of certain health care products and efforts to create a system for a national overview of access to and demand for medicines are also in progress.

• More about health and social care in Section 7.3.7 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Lasting energy supply

A well-functioning energy supply is key to a society’s ability to continue to function during heightened alert and ultimately war. There is need for a clear structure for outlining who can decide on extraordinary measures and at what stage, and it must be ensured that resources are available to take those measures. Planning is needed for consumption prioritisation and allocation of limited resources, not least to maintain necessary supply during heightened alert.

The Government’s ambition of developing and safeguarding the energy supply concerns not only electricity, but liquid fuel, gas, heating and air conditioning, and links between these areas. NATO membership also affects total defence planning for energy. The measures concern creating conditions for a more robust and durable energy supply. Work to develop electricity preparedness needs to continue and be enhanced so as to minimise consequences of power outages and enable the supply to be quickly restored. This involves measures such as continued investment in preparedness for infrastructure repair in terms of both material and personnel, insular supply and fortifying protection. In this context, the Government stresses that civilian service within operations with responsibility for electricity supply should be developed further as regards individuals who have already undergone fundamental training in this area.

• More about energy supply in section 7.3.4 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Capacity-increasing measures and development needs within transport

Transport infrastructure and transport are important for Sweden’s trade and supply capacity, and to maintain essential services ahead of and during heightened alert and ultimately war. Transport is also a prerequisite for the Swedish Armed Forces’ mobilisation, security of supplies and operational capability. Public transport at both regional and interregional level will be important during heightened alert, particularly for evacuation and transport of personnel assigned to wartime postings.

To be able to safeguard access to goods that are essential to the ability to relocate the civilian population and military forces, a well-functioning and maintained infrastructure of roads, railways, ports and airports is vital. In light of this, the Government has advanced and intensified Nordic cooperation with Finland, Norway and Denmark on transport preparedness and cross-border transport infrastructure. The Government is also seeking to strengthen the competitiveness and preparedness of Swedish shipping and has therefore taken several initiatives so that more ships fly the Swedish flag and there are enough sailors with Swedish citizenship to staff them. The Government is also working to strengthen the competitiveness of Swedish aviation and airports. This includes doubling the state grant for operational support to non-state airports.

• More about transport in section 7.3.11 of the Total Defence Bill (Swedish) See also Section 6.8.2 Military infrastructure needs (in Swedish)

Continued measures for electronic communications and postal services

For the total defence to be able to manage the consequences of an armed attack, maintaining electronic communications and postal services is very important. Few actors are fully independent within the civil preparedness sector, which makes public-private collaboration essential. The Government considers that the preparedness work by actors within the sector and the division of responsibility between public and private actors need to be strengthened to manage the demands during heightened alert. These include the ability to exchange sensitive information, maintain lasting repair preparedness and implement effective collaboration under difficult conditions.

The Government’s view is that measures need to be taken to increase robustness and resilience in networks and services to strengthen resilience to strains in both the physical and cyber domains. This could include investments in reserve power to ensure durability in densely populated areas. Measures should also be taken to increase redundancy and maintain functionality in critical parts of networks and in alternative command locations. The distribution of post and parcels is vulnerable to power outages, sabotage and disruptions in road and railway networks. Measures to increase robustness are thus also important for the postal sector.

• More about electronic communications and postal services in Section 7.3.3 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Access to food and drinking water contributes to the population’s will to defend itself

A well-functioning and robust food supply and personal preparedness of the civil population are ultimately a matter of survival and maintaining the will to defend. This is critical for society’s resilience. Sweden needs robust domestic food production to be able to maintain the food supply in case of trade disruptions that can arise when there is a risk of war or during war. This in turn requires domestic production of input goods and preparedness and deployment stockpiles of such goods. The Government considers that stockpiling and promoting domestic production of input goods such as grains are important measures towards building up a robust food supply.

Drinking water production and functioning sewage and waste management are vital for life and health, and for the ability of many other parts of society to function. The Government also considers it important that the municipalities ensure that efforts are undertaken concerning planning and logistics for drinking water supply. This includes the ability to distribute emergency water, stockpiles of chemicals and spare parts, and ensuring availability of reserve power. The same applies for sewage management, which is also dependent on reserve water, electricity supply and access to chemicals.

• More about food supply and drinking water in Section 7.3.8 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Adaptations within public order and safety

Activities in the public order and safety sector are currently geared primarily towards peacetime. Measures are needed to adapt certain activities to conditions during heightened alert and ultimately war. A war on Swedish territory would increase the demand for police activities, and place somewhat different requirements on the police than during peacetime. For example, this could include supporting the Swedish Armed Forces mobilisation to assist in evacuating the civilian population, or combating plundering and rioting. The Defence Commission finds that there is a need for the police to provide a reinforcement function during heightened alert and ultimately war. The Government has appointed an Inquiry whose remit includes examining this issue.

It is essential that the judicial system also functions during heightened alert and ultimately war. In the event of war in Sweden, measures such as internment of prisoners of war may be necessary. The Government sees a need for continued analysis of the roles of various government agencies with respect to internment. In the event of war, extensive movements of people can be expected, both within countries and across borders. There is a need to more clearly coordinate measures related to migration issues with measures taken in other civil defence activities. The Government therefore intends to review how migration issues can be incorporated into the structure of the civil preparedness sectors.

• More about public order and safety in Section 7.3.9 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Crisis management to maintain financial services

The capacity of all other civil preparedness sectors depends heavily on the financial services preparedness sector and private actors such as banks, insurance companies and other businesses that handle cash and provide infrastructure for mass payments. The financial sector needs to be highly resilient to be able to resist attacks that eliminate or seriously limit the ability to make payments between individuals, companies and government agencies. The Government sees a need for planning, trained preparations and reserve processes to ensure that the financial system’s basic functionality is maintained, even when electricity and electronic communications have been cut. To give government agencies better conditions to work actively to build capacity in this sector, the Government has proposed allocating additional funding to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and the Swedish National Debt Office in the Budget Bill for 2025.

It is important that a functioning and comprehensive structure is in place for planning and preparations within the payments sector for heightened alert and ultimately war, and that it is clear how this should be managed. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority is the responsible government agency for this preparedness sector. According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act (2022:1568), the Riksbank is responsible for ensuring that the general public is able to make payments in both peacetime crisis situations and during heightened alert. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and the Riksbank therefore have overlapping responsibility for issues concerning civil defence. The Government Offices (Ministry of Finance) has tasked an Inquiry with reviewing and presenting proposals for an operational crisis management function during serious operational disturbances in the financial sector’s digital infrastructure. The aim of the remit was to create conditions that enable necessary financial services, particularly the payment system, to be maintained, and thus protect financial stability in the event of such an operational disturbance. The Inquiry report has been referred for comment and is now being processed in the Government Offices.

• More about financial services in Section 7.3.5 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Secure IT operations to ensure access to basic data

Basic data is information on people, companies, properties and geography that needs to be accessible to actors that carry out essential public services both during peacetime and during heightened alert and ultimately war. Activities within this sector depend on functionality within areas such as electricity supply, electronic communications and economic security.

Digitalisation requires robustness and redundancy in information management of basic data. Secure IT operating solutions are a prerequisite for ensuring that information is available only to the individuals who are authorised to access it, and for the correctness and accessibility of government agencies’ information. The Government intends to take measures to the increase the security and cost-effectiveness of government agencies’ IT operations. Since 2017, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency has been tasked with offering coordinated and secure IT operation for certain government agencies. The Government sees a need to expand this work and regulate it in the long term.

• More about provision of basic data in Section 7.3.6 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Active efforts to ensure economic security

Central government disbursements and determining and levying taxes are essential public services that must always be maintained, even during heightened alert and ultimately war. The government agencies within the economic security preparedness sector have responsibilities including disbursing central government benefits and ensuring that the basic funding of public sector activities is maintained. Issues concerning the overall payment system, cash management, electricity supply, IT service and information, and cyber security are critical for maintaining this sector’s activities. This sector also has strong dependencies on the private business sector.

Greater robustness within disbursements and central government salary services requires active work to ensure a high level of information security and cybersecurity. The issue of how to ensure continuity of disbursements during war or the threat of war is important for social insurance and other disbursements for which the Swedish Social Insurance Agency is responsible, such as family allowance to conscripts. Any interruption of the ability to disburse funds risks major consequences for individuals, municipalities and ultimately the financial system. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency has indicated that the regulatory framework for social insurance needs to be reviewed. This issue is being studied by the Government Offices.

• More about economic security in Section 7.3.2 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Personal preparedness for resilience

In the event of war, a lower level of ambition can be expected within most sectors than would be the case in a normal situation. This would entail extensive limitations throughout society and demand huge efforts on the part of all of society. Society’s collective resources would need to be prioritised according to where the needs are greatest. The general public’s preparedness and acceptance of a considerably lower level of public services are a prerequisite, and a key part of resisting and mitigating consequences for society during heightened alert. For individual citizens who ordinarily get by without public assistance, it is essential to be prepared to cope for at least one week without assistance.

The Government considers it important to provide information on self-protection to the population. Self-protection concerns how individuals can protect themselves and should act in various situations, such as when protective shelters are not accessible or when planned protection alternatives do not work. Based on its government remit, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has produced a new version of the brochure If Crisis or War Comes. Campaigns such as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s Beredskapsveckan (Preparedness Week), training held by study associations and other adult education actors, information in workplaces and initiatives undertaken by community and cultural organisations are also important as regards informing and educating the general public.

• More about individuals’ personal preparedness in Section 7.2.5 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

An overhaul of cybersecurity

The aim of cyber-attacks during peacetime, heightened alert and war can be to impair or destroy digital infrastructure and digital services within essential services or to use those structures and services to carry out attacks against civilian objects and military targets. It is therefore imperative that digital infrastructure and services are robust, secure and functional across the entire conflict spectrum. The Government is taking a number of measures to develop and strengthen the systematic and risk-based work on information security and cybersecurity.

The Government continues to reorganise Sweden’s national cybersecurity centre with the National Defence Radio Establishment as responsible authority for its operations. The objective is to establish a stronger national structure and a clear hub for cybersecurity work. Another measure is the implementation of the EU’s new Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2 Directive) in Swedish legislation. Another example is the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s tool for follow-up on information security and cybersecurity efforts. This tool provides guidance to organisations on developing their systematic work in this area. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency will also expand its Tänk säkert (Think Secure) campaign to promote more secure digital activity in society. A national survey of municipalities’ technical cybersecurity capability will be carried out. Development of the NCC-SE (national cybersecurity coordination centre) continues with the aim of taking Sweden to the forefront on cybersecurity. The Government is also working on a national cybersecurity strategy that will provide a new, clear direction with a concrete action plan.

• More about information security and cybersecurity in Section 8.2 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)

Strengthening other essential public services

There are other essential public services that need to be maintained during heightened alert and ultimately war. These include burial and cremation services and spiritual guidance, the cultural scene and protection of cultural heritage, the preschool and school system, civil society and construction and repairs preparedness. The Government intends to consider various ways in which additional essential public services can be strengthened for war and heightened alert.

• More about other essential public services in Section 7.3.12 of the Total Defence Bill (in Swedish)