Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at The Society and Defence Annual National Conference 2026

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to speak about Europe.

A Europe that safeguards its own security. 

A Europe that can set the agenda rather than simply reacting to international events. 

A Europe that is able to defend its interests in a world characterised by competition, conflict and confrontation. 

When others – both externally and from within – attempt to divide Europe, Sweden and the Nordic region must be a strengthening and unifying force. 

I envisage five tasks for Europe to be able to meet the scale of the security policy challenges we are now facing.  

Firstly: Every discussion about European security begins and ends with Ukraine. This is why support to Ukraine must increase.

JD Vance shook Europe – quite literally – with his speech almost a year ago. But my lasting memory from Munich was not that speech. My lasting memory was a meeting I had with a young, one-armed Ukrainian man who had come from the front line. He didn’t want to talk about losing his arm in the war; he wanted to talk about losing his best friend. He had a challenge for us: Make sure that my friend did not die in vain. 

That shook me.

***

We know what Ukraine needs – regardless of the outcome of negotiations currently underway: more money and more weapons.

Sweden and our Nordic neighbours are doing our part, and more besides. Last year, the list of countries that gave the most to Ukraine in relation to their GDP was headed by Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 

Together, the Nordic countries accounted for a third of NATO’s combined military support to Ukraine.

Going forward, we will need to see a broader, more long-term approach, that involves joint European responsibility.

We have already made progress in this area: The EUR 90 billion EU loan, agreed at the European Council in December, will meet two-thirds of Ukraine’s financing needs over the coming two years.

This is good, and Sweden has been a driving force behind it. Ukrainian soldiers, firefighters and nurses will continue to be paid. Ukraine will be able to continue to defend its freedom – and ours. But it’s not enough. Every country in Europe must continue to contribute, both collectively and individually. And over time.

Large amounts of money will be required. But these amounts are not unreasonable compared to what Europe spent on pandemic support, for example. 

Furthermore, the cost must be weighed against the consequences of not helping Ukraine. 

The Russian leadership has consistently been clear: Its ultimate aim of waging war in Ukraine is not the military control of limited areas of Donbas; it is political control of the whole of Ukraine, redefining Europe’s security policy landscape in the process.

Secondly: The pressure on Russia must increase. 

This is why my Finnish colleague Elina and I have presented three proposals for forthcoming sanctions packages.

We want to see a total embargo on all European companies offering any services whatsoever to vessels transporting Russian oil, gas and coal. No shipments. No transfers of cargo between vessels. No insurance. No repairs in port. 

We want to see measures against Russian fertilisers, which are the third largest category of goods exported from Russia to the EU. 

And we want to put a stop to exports of luxury goods from the EU to Russia. These goods are not vital to the Russian war economy, but morally it is the right thing to do. I find it offensive that wealthy Russian consumers can wear expensive Italian designer clothing and drink fine French wines. A country must not be allowed to violate European values and still enjoy exclusive European products. 

So, despite 19 sanctions packages, much more could be done to increase the pressure on Russia.

Thirdly: Transatlantic relations need a new balance.  

It is logical that Europe assumes greater responsibility for NATO in response to shifts in the strategic priorities of the United States. 

We made considerable progress in this regard at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, with a new common spending target. This must now be quickly translated into real capabilities, which can strengthen our collective deterrence and our defence. 

Sweden is taking its responsibility at national level. And we’re aiming to pursue our target at a faster rate than required by the agreement reached in The Hague. 

We are also taking our responsibility as an alliance member. Sweden’s military presence in Latvia represents a significant contribution; as does our leadership of NATO’s Forward Land Forces in Finland, which is also an expression of the growing importance of the Arctic and the High North. 

Swedish vessels are strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea, and we are helping to provide stronger deterrence along NATO’s entire eastern flank. 

Just like our closest neighbours, we have learnt the lesson of history: Russia does not stop – Russia is stopped.

And stability between Europe and Russia, as referred to in the recently published US security strategy, assumes one thing: A Russia that remains – and is kept – within its internationally recognised borders.

Fourthly: We need to affirm the geopolitical significance of the EU.

European cooperation was founded first and foremost to manage internal European challenges. 

But over the years, we have also come to realise how important the EU is in relation to its dealings with countries outside the Union. 

Through its trade policy, through its enlargement policy and through the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 

This external dimension needs to be strengthened further.

In the area of foreign policy, the EU would be more effective if more decisions could be taken by qualified majority.

In the area of defence policy, a Sweden that affirms the emerging defence dimension within the EU, would both complement and support NATO. 

And not least financially.

With the internal market at its heart, the EU is a genuine economic superpower. 

Of the world’s 10 most innovative countries, six are European, and four – Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark – are EU Member States.

***

Sometimes I think we underestimate our own significance.

***

The fact that governments from Latin America to India want to deepen their trade and cooperation with the EU also shows that we are a relevant, strategic and reliable partner. Reliability has proven to be a strong currency in these turbulent times.

It is also through the EU – and through the partnerships that it can build – that we have our best chance of influencing global developments, of safeguarding international law and of working for continued international cooperation in accordance with the rules-based international order that has made the world safer, wealthier and freer since the Second World War.

Fifthly: We must strengthen cooperation with our closest neighbours and friends. 

NATO is our most important defence policy arena, and the EU is the most important for foreign policy.

We are supplementing this with a network of closer collaborations with partners and Allies in our neighbourhood. With those to whom we are closest. With our friends.

We are driving Nordic and Nordic-Baltic cooperation, which is more closely-knit today than ever.

We are strengthening the security policy dialogue between the countries of the Council of the Baltic Sea States – which also includes Poland and Germany. This constellation will become even more important going forward. 

The fact that Poland chose Sweden as a partner to develop its submarine capability opens up new opportunities for enhanced cooperation between Stockholm and Warsaw in other areas as well. 

We friends in the north and around the Baltic Sea – together with strategic partners such as the UK and France – are now a security policy engine for the whole of Europe.

***

To increase support to Ukraine. To increase the pressure on Russia. To strengthen Europe’s role in NATO. To strive for a stronger EU. And to build even stronger bonds with our closest friends and neighbours.

These are our tasks.

The threat from the east and the signals from the west are entirely different. But the answer remains the same: to strengthen Europe.

Now, more than ever, strong European cooperation is a core Swedish interest. 

When Europe is strong, Sweden stands even stronger. When Europe rearms, Swedes are more secure. When Europe becomes more competitive, Sweden becomes wealthier. 

Europe is not merely a continent on a map. 

Europe represents the promise that cooperation and common democratic institutions can overcome historic conflict, and turn former enemies into friends.

Europe represents law and order – within states and between states.

Europe represents human rights – not just in words. 

This is our Europe, and it is a Europe that is worth defending.